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CRIMINAL LAW REFORM AND THE
PERSISTENCE OF STRICT LIABILITY
DARRYL K. BROWN†
ABSTRACT
Two reform movements transformed American criminal law in the
quarter century that began in the late 1960s. Their origins and effects
were starkly different, and their conflict meant that, on core choices
about the basis for criminal liability, one movement had to win and
the other had to lose. The first movement was the wave of criminal
code reform inspired by the American Law Institute’s Model Penal
Code (MPC), first published in 1962. The MPC movement sought to
increase the role of culpability as a prerequisite for liability by
presumptively requiring proof of mens rea for every element of
criminal offenses—a policy that rejected longstanding use of strict
liability for significant offense elements. The second movement, which
could be called the tough-on-crime movement, became the more
significant. This movement led to the transformation of American
criminal-justice policy that expanded criminal offenses, enforcement,
and sentences, resulting in a national incarceration rate that
quintupled and became by far the world’s highest.
This Article identifies the twenty-four states that codified the
MPC’s culpability rules and then recounts an extensive survey of the
case law in those states to assess the reforms’ effect on judicial
interpretation of mens rea requirements. It finds that legislative
codifications of presumptions for mens rea have had surprisingly little
effect on courts that define mens rea requirements when interpreting
criminal statutes. It describes the recurrent rationales that courts use to
impose strict-liability elements in a wide range of crimes,
notwithstanding statutes that direct presumptions to the contrary. It
then offers an explanation for this outcome—a substantial failure of
the MPC-inspired revision of criminal codes—that emphasizes the
continuing normative appeal of strict liability, the influence of
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instrumental rationales for punishment, and the limits of the judicial
role in an era in which the legislative and executive branches are
vastly expanding the reach and severity of criminal punishment.
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INTRODUCTION
Two significant reform movements transformed American
criminal law in the quarter century that began in the late 1960s. Both
are familiar, yet in the continuing story of American criminal law they
rarely appear in the same narrative. In part that is surely because
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their origins and effects were starkly different; in critical ways they
were in conflict. That conflict meant that, on core questions of
criminal law, one reform movement had to win and the other had to
lose. The effects of the movements’ conflict continue today in the
administration of state criminal law.
The first movement was the wave of criminal-code reform
inspired by the American Law Institute’s (ALI’s) Model Penal Code
1
(MPC), which was first published in 1962. Broadly speaking, the
MPC had two ambitions. One was to bring analytical clarity to the
definition and interpretation of criminal statutes that were encrusted
2
with ill-defined common-law terms such as “malice aforethought.” A
tradition of poor drafting plagued these statutes, so they commonly
employed multiple mens rea terms and conduct-defining terms in the
3
same offense. The second ambition was substantive: the MPC
advocated a criminal law committed to a pervasive requirement of
subjective culpability with respect to every significant element of
4
5
every offense. MPC policy, in other words, rejected strict liability for
any element of a crime, which resulted in liability being imposed
1. MODEL PENAL CODE (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
2. Herbert Wechsler, Codification of Criminal Law in the United States: The Model Penal
Code, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 1425, 1431–40 (1968); Paul H. Robinson & Markus Dirk Dubber, An
Introduction to the Model Penal Code 8–13 (Mar. 12, 1999) (unpublished manuscript), available
at https://www.law.upenn.edu/fac/phrobins/intromodpencode.pdf.
3. Wechsler, supra note 2, at 1436; Robinson & Dubber, supra note 2, at 8.
4. See Herbert L. Packer, The Model Penal Code and Beyond, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 594,
594–95 (1963) (“The most important aspect of the Code is its affirmation of the centrality of
mens rea, an affirmation that is brilliantly supported by its careful articulation of the elements of
liability and of the various modes of culpability to which attention must be paid in framing the
definitions of the various criminal offenses.”).
5. The phrase strict liability in felony criminal statutes bears specification. Offenses that
require mens rea for one element (typically conduct) but lack culpability on one or more other
elements are considered strict-liability offenses. Courts and statutes use the term in this way.
See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-102 (LexisNexis 2008) (describing strict-liability offenses);
Ex parte Murry, 455 So. 2d 72, 75–79 (Ala. 1984) (noting that a capital offense that did not
require knowledge as to the victim’s identity as a police officer would be a strict-liability
offense), superseded by Undercover Officers Protection Act of 1987, No. 87-709, 1987 Ala. Laws
1252 (codified as amended at ALA. CODE § 13A-5-40 (LexisNexis 2005)). Scholars do so as well;
Professor Antony Duff denotes this “substantive” strict liability:
Liability is strict if it requires no proof of fault as to an aspect of the offence: while
mens rea must be proved as to some elements in the offence definition, it need not be
proved as to every fact, consequence or circumstance necessary for the commission of
the offence. . . . Liability is substantively strict if it does not depend on proof of some
appropriate moral culpability as to some aspect of the offence—proof of some fault
that would justify condemning the defendant for committing the offence.
R.A. Duff, Strict Liability, Legal Presumptions, and the Presumption of Innocence, in
APPRAISING STRICT LIABILITY 125, 125–26 (A.P. Simester ed., 2005).
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more proportionately to an actor’s moral fault than was true in the
common-law tradition.
The second reform movement was less singular in its origin and
in the identity of its leading reformers, but it was indisputably more
significant. This tough-on-crime movement represented the
transformation of criminal law, enforcement, and sentencing policy
triggered by the rising crime rates and social disorder of 1960s—and
arguably by the political transformations of the civil rights movement,
which occurred concurrently. Familiar features of this movement
include a dominant tough-on-crime political discourse, a national
incarceration rate that quintupled in three decades to become the
world’s highest, an increased racial disproportionality in inmate
populations, a creation of broad new criminal offenses and pretrial
detention policies, a punitive approach to problems of illicit drug use
and distribution, and a rejection of punishment practices based on
individualized assessments of offenders in favor of retributive and
6
deterrence rationales codified in nondiscretionary sentencing rules.
The MPC is generally considered a success for having inspired
roughly half the states to revise their criminal codes in ways that
7
indisputably reveal the MPC’s influence. But a closer look at state

6. The literature recounting this wide-ranging reformation is considerable. See generally,
e.g., DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN
CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY (2002) (charting the changes in crime and in the criminal-justice
system in Britain and the United States since the 1970s); DOUGLAS N. HUSAK,
OVERCRIMINALIZATION: THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW (2008) (investigating the
“increased size and scope of the criminal law” and criminal-justice system in the United States);
MARC MAUER, RACE TO INCARCERATE (2d ed. 2006) (assessing the increased reliance on
incarceration in the United States criminal-justice system); PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, ONE IN
31: THE LONG REACH OF AMERICAN CORRECTIONS (2009), available at
http://www.pewstates.org/uploadedFiles/PCS_Assets/2009/PSPP_1in31_report_FINAL_WEB_3
-26-09.pdf (investigating patterns behind rising incarceration rates in the United States);
JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME (2007) (examining the emergence of “a new
civil and political order structured around the problem of violent crime”); WILLIAM J. STUNTZ,
THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2011) (citing failures of the American
criminal-justice system); MICHAEL TONRY, SENTENCING MATTERS (1997) (discussing the
development of the American sentencing system and proposing reforms); BRUCE WESTERN,
PUNISHMENT AND INEQUALITY IN AMERICA (2006) (investigating the relationship between
incarceration and inequality); Vesla M. Weaver, Frontlash: Race and the Development of
Punitive Crime Policy, 21 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 230 (2007) (explaining the relationship between
race and increased criminalization in the latter half of the twentieth century).
7. See Sanford H. Kadish, Fifty Years of Criminal Law: An Opinionated Review, 87 CALIF.
L. REV. 943, 948 (1999) (“The success of the [MPC] in stimulating American jurisdictions to
codify or recodify their criminal law was unprecedented.”); William J. Stuntz, The Pathological
Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 511 (2001) (“The Model Penal Code . . . is
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codes, and their interpretation since the 1970s, reveals that the MPC’s
analytical ambition was a much greater success than its substantive
goal, and further that the failure of the latter undermines the former.
The MPC’s substantive agenda turned out to be poorly timed;
legislatures took up code reform at the same time that they sought to
dramatically increase criminal law’s effectiveness as a tool against
violent crime and drug markets, which they did by increasing
sentences, the range of offenses, and the scope of individual crime
definitions. The MPC’s substantive agenda cut the other way by
seeking to limit liability unjustified by a finding of fault through proof
of mens rea. When the MPC reform movement conflicted with the
tough-on-crime movement, it was, unsurprisingly, the MPC’s reform
efforts—the efforts of legal professionals and academics more than
politicians—that lost.
Yet that loss is not readily apparent, because twenty-four state
codes notably resemble the MPC, especially as to the central
culpability rules in MPC “Part I: General Provisions”—the provisions
that provide definitions, premises, and interpretive rules for specific
8
offenses. Those provisions define the critical elements of the MPC’s
widely (though not universally, and perhaps not correctly) regarded as a great success.”); id. at
584 & n.279 (stating that the MPC inspired a large number of state code revisions).
8. MODEL PENAL CODE pt. I (Official Draft 1985). By my criteria, in 2011, twenty-four
states had “general principles” or “rules of construction” that adopted variants of MPC
§ 2.02(3) and § 2.02(4). They are: ALA. CODE §§ 13A-2-3 to -4 (LexisNexis 2005); ALASKA
STAT. § 11.81.610 (2010); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-202 (2010); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-203
(2006); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 18-1-502 to -503 (2012); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-5 (2007);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 251 (2007); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 702-204, -207 (LexisNexis
2007); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/4-3 (West 2002); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-41-2-2 (LexisNexis
2009); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5202 (Supp. 2011); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 501.040 (West 2006);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 34 (2006); MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 562.021, -.026 (West 2012);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 626:2 (LexisNexis 2007); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-2 (West 2005); N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 15.15 (McKinney 2009); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-02-02 (2012); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2901.21 (West 2006); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 161.095, -.105, -.115 (2011); 18 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 302 (West 1998); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-11-301 (2010); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
§§ 6.01 to -.04 (West 2011); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-102 (LexisNexis 2008). Kentucky,
however, is a marginal case: it lacks an equivalent to MPC § 2.02(4), and it codified only a
weakened modification of § 2.02(3) in KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 501.040 (West 2006); see also
infra note 19. I exclude Montana’s code because it includes no version of MPC § 2.02(3) or
§ 2.02(4), even though it reflects MPC influence because its code requires at least negligence
“with respect to each element described by the statute.” MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-103 (2011);
see also id. § 45-2-104 (requiring culpability for “each element of offense”). This negligence
requirement was adapted from MPC § 2.02(1) and § 2.05. Washington is also excluded because
its code lacks any reference to the MPC’s mens rea presumptions, although its definitions of
culpability terms track the MPC. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.08.010 (2009). Louisiana is also
excluded because its culpability definitions reflect little MPC influence. Most notably, it retains
the common law terms “general intent” and “specific intent” and does not adopt the MPC’s
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analytical advance: an exclusive list of clearly defined mens rea terms
coupled with a set of interpretive rules that both imply mens rea
requirements in offense definitions that lack a mens rea term and that
presume that an explicit mens rea term in a statute applies to all of its
9
elements. The problem is that the MPC’s analytical and substantive
agendas are not easily separated. Rejecting the commitment to
proportional, subjective culpability undermines the MPC’s approach
to consistent analytical clarity in the interpretation of criminal
offenses, and thus in the clarity of criminal law generally.
The project of this Article is, first, to document how the MPCinspired analytical advances in state criminal codes have turned out to
be less significant than they initially seemed. The second ambition is
to explain why American criminal law turned out this way. One
explanation lies, as noted above, in recent political history. A second
explanation, however, is situated in contemporary criminal-law
theory, where debates continue, by courts as well as scholars,
regarding the normative appeal of the MPC’s commitment to
proportional culpability. More broadly, the debate is about the
meaning of criminal law’s core premise, actus non facit reum nisi mens
10
sit rea: no guilty act without a guilty mind. Anglo-American criminal

culpability terms and definitions. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:7–14:12 (2007) (setting out
general principles of criminal law).
9. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(3) (“When the culpability sufficient to establish a
material element of an offense is not prescribed by law, such element is established if a person
acts purposely, knowingly or recklessly with respect thereto.”); id. § 2.02(4) (noting that an
explicit culpability term applies to all material elements “unless a contrary purpose plainly
appears”). These are the two most important provisions, and I use primarily these two to
classify jurisdictions as “MPC states” in Parts I and II. The MPC, however, contains additional
provisions that address culpability requirements and their effect on liability. See, e.g., MODEL
PENAL CODE § 2.02(1) (stating that guilt requires at least proof of negligence for each material
element); id. § 2.03 (stating that causation is not established unless a result was “within the
purpose or the contemplation of the actor” or “within the risk of which the actor . . . should be
aware”); id. § 2.04(2) (“[I]gnorance or mistake . . . shall reduce the grade and degree of the
offense of which [the defendant] may be convicted to those of the offense of which he would be
guilty had the situation been as he supposed.”); id. § 2.05 (“[W]hen absolute liability is imposed
with respect to any material element of an offense . . . the offense constitutes [only a noncriminal] violation . . . .”).
10. R v. Tolson, (1889) 23 Q.B.D. 168, 172 (Eng.) (internal quotation mark omitted); see
also, e.g., Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 251 (1952) (noting that liability requires the
“concurrence of an evil-meaning mind with an evil-doing hand”); People v. Valley Steel Prods.
Co., 375 N.E.2d 1297, 1305 (Ill. 1978) (“It would be unthinkable to subject a person to a long
term of imprisonment for an offense he might commit unknowingly.”). William Blackstone has
also noted that “to constitute a crime against human laws, there must be first, a vicious will; and,
secondly, an unlawful act consequent upon such vicious will.” 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *21; see also State v. Rutley, 171 P.3d 361, 363 & n.3 (Or. 2007) (citing
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law has long moved on from the most restrictive understanding of this
premise, labeled the “unlawful act” theory, attributed to Sir Edward
Coke and according to which the voluntary commission of any
criminal conduct made one criminally liable for any resulting harm.
On Coke’s view, wrongfully shooting at a chicken and unforeseeably
11
killing a person constituted murder. Its antipode is the MPC
12
position, found in some state codes and defended by many criminal
law scholars, that criminal liability requires that an actor be
culpable—meaning he has intent, knowledge, or recklessness—as to
13
each significant element of an offense. Among English scholars, this
14
idea is called the principle of correspondence. On both the
American and English accounts, the effect of mens rea requirements
for each offense element provides its normative appeal: the degree of
liability and punishment will be proportionate to culpability and
limited by it. Yet the dominant view in contemporary courts regarding
mens rea requirements lies between Coke’s view at one end of the
spectrum and the MPC position at the other. Especially in states that
adopted the MPC’s culpability provisions, this represents a failure of
those statutes (and the MPC model) to constrain and direct judicial
decision making. More broadly, the courts’ dominant position reveals
that the MPC’s substantive position on culpability—or the
correspondence principle—has proven normatively unpersuasive to
courts, which adopt instead a more limited, intermediate role for
culpability in criminal liability.
Blackstone’s remark to support the statement that “[i]n Oregon, criminal liability generally
requires an act that is combined with a particular mental state”).
11. See 3 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES OF THE LAWES OF ENGLAND 56 (London, W.
Clarke & Sons 1809) (1669) (“[If the Defendant has shot] at any tame fowle of another mans,
and the arrow by [mistake] had killed a man, this had been murder, for the act was unlawfull.”).
12. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-2(a) (West 2005) (noting that, with specified
exceptions, “a person is not guilty of an offense unless he acted purposely, knowingly, recklessly
or negligently . . . with respect to each material element of the offense”).
13. See, e.g., Andrew Ashworth, A Change of Normative Position: Determining the
Contours of Culpability in Criminal Law, 11 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 232, 235–38 (2008) (noting that
“[s]ubjectivist justifications for culpability focus on the elements of choice and belief, and so
may be found at the opposite end of the spectrum of liability for resulting harm”). This idea of
proportional culpability appears in the constitutional law governing capital murder. See, e.g.,
Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 800 (1982) (“American criminal law has long considered a
defendant’s intention—and therefore his moral guilt—to be critical to ‘the degree of [his]
criminal culpability,’ and the Court has found criminal penalties to be unconstitutionally
excessive in the absence of intentional wrongdoing.” (alteration in original) (citation omitted)
(quoting Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 698 (1975))).
14. E.g., ANDREW ASHWORTH, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 76 (6th ed. 2007); VICTOR
TADROS, CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY 93–97 (2005).
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This debate over culpability requirements matters for broader
reasons of political legitimacy—the justifications of state authority to
punish individuals and the practical meaning of state respect for
individual rights. The correspondence principle has been defended as
essential to respect for autonomy; it ensures that one is punished only
for choices one has made, not for events one did not will or
15
anticipate. It reflects basic values of classical liberalism and rejects
the state’s power to use individuals for public ends, even for a
16
laudable goal like harm prevention. State codes that fail to abide by
the correspondence principle implicitly assert a different justification
for criminal law, for state power over citizens’ liberty and individual
autonomy. Yet most do fail to adhere to the correspondence
principle, even the states that enacted MPC culpability provisions.
The prevalence of strict-liability elements in state felony crimes,
typically for result and circumstance elements, demonstrates this
pervasive failure. These strict-liability elements frequently define the
difference between greater and lesser offenses, and thus the sole
17
ground for greater (sometimes mandatory) punishments. This form
of strict liability, affirmed and expanded by widespread interpretive
practices of courts in MPC states, means that punishment bears no
proportional relation to culpability, despite states’ codification of
MPC-based culpability rules.
Finally, this Article’s assessment of contemporary criminal law in
the wake of the MPC and tough-on-crime reform movements
generates insights on issues of judicial craft and institutional role.
State courts’ patterns of criminal statutory construction provide
another lesson in the challenges of simplifying and stabilizing judicial
methods of statutory interpretation. In the wake of state legislatures
15. See Ashworth, supra note 13, at 238 (“Starting from respect for the moral autonomy of
all individuals, subjectivists argue that criminal liability should not be imposed in respect of a
given harm unless [the defendant] intended to cause or knowingly risked causing that
harm . . . .”).
16. See ASHWORTH, supra note 14, at 87 (noting the link between the correspondence
principle and individual autonomy); TADROS, supra note 14, at 93–97 (highlighting the
arguments supporting and undercutting the connection between the correspondence principle,
subjectivity, and autonomy).
17. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6-401(7)(a)(I)–(II) (2012) (defining knowing or
reckless child abuse as a class 2 felony if death results and a class 3 felony if serious bodily injury
results). Even the MPC cannot avoid some offense distinctions based on results without
corresponding proof of a culpable mental state. Compare MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 210.1, -.3
(Official Draft 1985) (defining manslaughter as reckless conduct causing death), with id. § 211.2
(defining reckless endangerment as conduct putting another at risk of death but not causing
death).
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adopting MPC-based interpretive rules for their criminal codes, state
courts have frequently disregarded them. When they have not, they
frequently construe those interpretive provisions themselves in a way
that undercuts their effect. Perhaps more notably, this Article also
reveals the limited capacity and inclination of American courts to
resist abetting political trends in criminal-justice policy. And this is so
even when those trends breach the codified commitments of criminal
law, and when courts’ alternative is merely to adhere to the legitimate
judicial role of narrowly construing criminal statutes and leaving
expansions of liability to the political branches. Part I offers a broad
survey of judicial interpretations of mens rea requirements in “MPC
states”—states I identify based on their codification of the most
important MPC culpability presumptions. It identifies recurrent
rationales and interpretive choices from decisions in a representative
range of MPC states. I then discuss how courts use these rationales to
limit or avoid the full effect of their states’ MPC-based culpability
presumptions. Part II looks more closely at the language of
culpability provisions that state legislatures have enacted. It classifies
all of the MPC states according to the strength of those presumptions.
Most MPC states enacted strong presumptions—meaning rules
equivalent to the MPC provisions. A notable minority chose to
weaken those presumptions and give legislative approval of strict
liability. But those “weak presumption” jurisdictions are not the only
ones in which judges favor strict liability, and the strength of the state
codes’ presumptions do not correlate well with judges’ interpretive
behavior in those MPC states. Part III describes the implicit limitedculpability principle that prevails among state courts to justify strict
liability. The dominant judicial view requires proof only of culpable
conduct, or culpability for some basic offense, to which additional
strict-liability elements are added to create a more serious offense.
Culpability serves only to make actors eligible for punishment;
beyond that, instrumental rationales determine offense grades and
sentencing severity. Part IV builds on this account to explain why
courts have continued to widely endorse strict criminal liability
despite legislative codification of presumptions for culpability
requirements. The explanatory story describes the normative appeal
of a limited role for culpability and also emphasizes courts’
institutional role during the last half century’s vast expansion of
criminal punishment.
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I. JUDICIAL INFERENCE OF CULPABILITY AND STRICT LIABILITY
A. A Note on Methodology
Although a complete survey of all state statutory provisions
governing culpability and adopted from the MPC is presented in Part
II, a comprehensive account of judicial interpretation practices for
mental-state requirements in the twenty-four MPC states would be a
more daunting endeavor than I undertake here. Fortunately, that is
not necessary for the present purpose, which is to identify trends in
the uses of MPC culpability presumptions and to identify the effects
that those presumptions have had in states that codified some version
of them. To identify interpretive practices in state courts, I first
reviewed all state criminal codes to identify those that codify an
identifiable variation of the MPC’s key interpretive rules and
presumptions regarding culpability requirements for elements of
18
criminal offenses—MPC § 2.02(3) and § 2.02(4). I coded twenty-four
states as “MPC states” on these criteria, listed in Table 1.

18. The two most important provisions are MPC § 2.02(3), which states that courts should
infer recklessness for any material element for which a culpability requirement is not specified,
and § 2.02(4), which states that an explicit culpability term applies to all material elements
“unless a contrary purpose plainly appears.” Only states that codified a variation of at least one
of these are listed as MPC states here.
For other important MPC provisions governing mens rea, see § 2.02(1), which requires
at least proof of negligence for each material element, and § 2.05, which states that “when
absolute liability is imposed with respect to any material element of an offense . . . the offense
constitutes [only a noncriminal] violation.” Sixteen of the twenty-four MPC states adopted a
version of § 2.02(1). See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 501.030(2) (West 2006); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 17-A, § 32 (2006); MO. ANN. STAT. § 562.016(1) (West 2012); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 45-2-103 (2011); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-2(a) (West 2005); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 302(a)
(West 1998); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-11-301(a)(1) (2010); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 6.02(a)
(West 2011). Seven have some version of MPC § 2.05. See, e.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/4-9
(West 2002 & Supp. 2012); MO. ANN. STAT. § 562.026 (West 2012); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2104 (2011). For a detailed accounting of state codes that incorporate MPC § 2.05 in varying
ways, see 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 5.5(c) n.47 (2d ed. 2003).
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Table 1.
MPC States
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Hawaii

Indiana
Illinois
Kansas
Kentucky

2011 Code
Sections
ALA. CODE
§§ 13A-2-3 to -4
ALASKA STAT.
§ 11.81.610
ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 13-202
ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 5-2-203
COLO. REV. STAT.
§§ 18-1-502 to -503
CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 53A-5
DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 11, § 251
HAW. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 702-204,
-207
IND. CODE ANN.
§ 35-41-2-2
720 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 5/4–3
KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 21-5202
KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 501.040

MPC States
Maine
Missouri
New
Hampshire
New Jersey
New York
North
Dakota
Ohio
Oregon

Pennsylvania
Tennessee
Texas
Utah

2011 Code
Sections
ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 17-A, § 34
MO. ANN. STAT.
§ 561.021, -.026
N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 626:2
N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2C:2-2
N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 15.15
N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 12.1-02-02
OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2901.21
OR. REV. STAT.
§§ 161.095, -.105,
-.115
18 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 302
TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 39-11-301
TEX. PENAL CODE
ANN. §§ 6.01 to -.04
UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 76-2-102

As Part II describes in more detail, I subclassified these states as
“strong” MPC states if their codes included versions of both MPC
§ 2.02(3) and § 2.02(4) and did not significantly weaken these
sections’ presumptions of mens rea, and as “weaker” or “weak” MPC
states if they either significantly modified one of those MPC
presumptions or failed to adopt one altogether.
To survey the case law addressing mens rea issues governed by
these MPC-based statutes, I limited the inquiry to court decisions
from eleven of these twenty-four MPC states—six in the stronger
19
category and five in the weaker. For narrative ease, I focus on the

19. To target states with larger bodies of case law, I biased selection toward states with
larger populations (thus avoiding, inter alia, Alaska, Delaware, and North Dakota). See Annual
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text primarily in seven states: Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois,
Missouri, Ohio, Oregon, and (to a lesser degree) Texas. Largely in
the footnotes, I add case law from the other four states—Alabama,
Indiana, New Jersey, and New York—that have case law that is
basically consistent with the case law discussed in the text.
To identify relevant decisions, I read every state appellate
decision available on Westlaw in each of the eleven states that cited
that state’s statutes codifying an MPC-based interpretive presumption
20
for mens rea requirements. From this search, a set of offenses
defined in nearly all eleven states appeared—primarily drug offenses,
weapons offenses, and offenses involving minors, all of which present
recurrent questions of mens rea requirements for critical elements
21
such as a weapon’s characteristics or a minor’s age. This method has
a limit, however, which is itself an indicator of the limited influence of
these MPC-based interpretive rules: state courts sometimes address
interpretive questions about mens rea requirements without any
22
reference to their states’ statutes that govern these questions. To
Estimates of the Resident Population for the United States, Regions, States, and Puerto Rico:
April 1, 2010 to July 1, 2011, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Dec. 1, 2011), http://www.census.gov/
popest/data/state/totals/2011/tables/NST-EST2011-01.xls (listing estimated state populations as
of July 2011). I also avoided states that adopted MPC-based statutes comparatively recently.
Thus I did not study Kansas case law because that state revised its code in 2011, Act effective
July 1, 2011, 2010 Kan. Sess. Laws 1409 (codified as amended in KAN. STAT. ANN. ch. 21 (Supp.
2011)), and so little case law exists under the new provisions. Additionally, I did not select
Kentucky because its code only marginally fits my criteria as an MPC state; it has no version of
MPC § 2.02(4) and a weak analog to § 2.02(3). See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 501.040 (West 2006)
(“Although no culpable mental state is expressly designated in a statute defining an offense, a
culpable mental state may nevertheless be required for the commission of such offense, or with
respect to some or all of the material elements thereof, if the proscribed conduct necessarily
involves such culpable mental state.”); id. § 501.030 (defining recklessness as the lowest
“culpable mental state”). I avoided North Dakota because its code’s equivalents to those MPC
provisions are uniquely worded (and poorly drafted) revisions. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-0202(2) (2012) (“If a statute . . . defining a crime does not specify any culpability and does not
provide explicitly that a person may be guilty without culpability, the culpability that is required
is willfully.”); id. § 12.1-02-02(1)(e) (defining “willfully” as “engag[ing] in the conduct
intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly”).
20. I located these decisions two ways: (1) running a Westlaw search in each state’s
appellate case law database for the relevant code provisions; and (2) using all cases listed in the
annotations to each state’s MPC-based statute.
21. The MPC itself includes one offense that expressly attaches strict liability to a
significant offense element, which is the element of the minor victim’s age (ten years old or less)
in sexual assaults. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6(1) (“Whenever . . . the criminality of
conduct depends on a child’s being below the age of 10, it is no defense that the actor did not
know the child’s age, or reasonably believed the child to be older than 10.”).
22. See, e.g., Steelman v. State, 602 N.E.2d 152, 154–56 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992); State v. Smith,
963 A.2d 281, 285–89 (N.J. 2009); Massey v. State, 933 S.W.2d 582, 584 (Tex. Ct. App. 1996).
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find a sampling of these decisions, I searched state appellate
databases and annotated codes for the type of offense that, in other
MPC jurisdictions, had presented a mens rea issue that led a court to
cite an MPC-based culpability rule. I also identified some decisions in
this category by their citation to earlier decisions that had cited the
MPC statutes. Finally, I supplemented these approaches by reference
to published surveys of state decisional law on specific crimes and
23
prior scholarship on mens rea rules in specific jurisdictions.
The survey reveals widespread judicial endorsement of strictliability elements in MPC jurisdictions, despite state statutes that
24
dictate presumptions otherwise. Culpability presumptions have
failed to displace judicial conventions of statutory interpretation that
favor strict liability. The overall picture is one in which codifications
25
of MPC-based mens rea provisions have had only modest effect.
23. My sources include: Catherine L. Carpenter, On Statutory Rape, Strict Liability, and the
Public Welfare Offense Model, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 313 (2003) (studying age elements in state
statutory rape offenses); Dannye Holley, The Influence of the Model Penal Code’s Culpability
Provisions on State Legislatures: A Study of Lost Opportunities, Including Abolishing the
Mistake of Fact Doctrine, 27 SW. U. L. REV. 229 (1997); Richard Singer, Strict Criminal Liability:
Alabama State Courts Lead the Way into the Twenty-First Century, 46 ALA. L. REV. 47 (1994)
(studying Alabama law); James R. Wyrsch & Jacqueline A. Cook, The Missouri Mens Rea
Requirement: New Missouri Supreme Court Opinion and How the Requirement Has Changed, 66
U.M.K.C. L. REV. 499 (1998) (studying Missouri law); Colin Campbell, Annotation, Mistake or
Lack of Information as to Victim’s Age as Defense to Statutory Rape, 46 A.L.R.5th 499 (1997);
Tracy A. Bateman, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of State Statutes
Prohibiting Sale or Possession of Controlled Substances Within Specified Distance of Schools, 27
A.L.R.5th 593 (1995); James N. Kourie, Annotation, Mens Rea or Guilty Intent as Necessary
Element of Offense of Contributing to Delinquency or Dependency of Minor, 31 A.L.R.3d 848
(1970). Additionally, I reviewed Westlaw’s case-law annotations under the culpabilitypresumption statutes of MPC jurisdictions.
24. As will be noted, describing court decisions as “contradicting” a codified interpretive
rule is a judgment call, because the statute defining the interpretive rule must itself be
interpreted, and at least in some cases reasonable disagreements can exist as to the better
interpretation. For another study finding state high courts that ignore their state legislature’s
codified rules of statutory interpretation, see Abbe R. Gluck, States as Laboratories of Statutory
Interpretation: Methodological Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J.
1750, 1787–91 (2010), which cites the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals as an example.
25. The modest effects of MPC provisions are disappointing at least from the perspective
of the MPC’s primary drafters and advocates, who were led by Professor Herbert Wechsler. For
his views, see, for example, Herbert Wechsler, Foreword to MODEL PENAL CODE, at xi. In that
Foreword, Professor Wechsler describes the MPC’s influence two decades after the release of its
preliminary draft, MODEL PENAL CODE (Proposed Official Draft 1962), and he counts thirtyfour states as having revised their codes under some influence of the MPC, Wechsler, supra, at
xi. That claim of thirty-four states is overstated in the sense that some of those code revisions
borrowed only in minor respects from the MPC and rejected its most important components,
including its Article 2 definitions of, and interpretive default rules for, culpability terms. See
supra note 8. Specifically, ten of those states enacted none of the culpability provisions in their
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Most courts in MPC states are far from committed to strong readings
of the culpability presumptions in their codes.
B. Limits on Culpability Presumptions (Part One): Plain Language
or Statutory Purpose
To begin, consider a routine mens rea question that faces state
courts. Most states have a statute, such as the following, that increases
the punishment for basic felony drug offenses upon proof of the
additional fact that the conduct occurred within a certain distance
26
from a school. A common definition of the offense reads:
Any person who, as prohibited in another section, sells or possesses
with intent to sell to another person any controlled substance within
one thousand feet of any public or private school shall be
imprisoned for a term of three years in addition and consecutive to
any term of imprisonment for any other offenses arising from the
same conduct. To constitute a violation of this subsection, an act of
transporting or possessing a controlled substance shall be with intent
27
to sell or dispense within one thousand feet of a school.

Note that the statute has an explicit mental-state requirement,
28
“with intent to,” which appears in the predicate offense as well. The
mens rea issue arises from the ambiguity in the last sentence; the
question is whether one must act with intent merely to sell, or also
with intent that the sale be within 1000 feet of a school.
The Connecticut Supreme Court interpreted this statute in State
29
v. Denby and recognized that its legislature provided guidance for

codes: Georgia, Florida, Iowa, Kansas (although Kansas finally adopted them in 2011, Act
effective July 1, 2011, § 13, 2010 Kan. Sess. Laws 1409, 1418–19 (codified at KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 21-5202 (Supp. 2011))), Nebraska, New Mexico, South Dakota, Virginia, Washington, and
Wyoming. For a comparable finding of the modest effects of state legislatures’ codification of
statutory-interpretation rules, see Gluck, supra note 24, at 1787–91.
26. See Bateman, supra note 23 (collecting statutes and cases).
27. This is an edited version of Public Act No. 89-256, § 1(b), 1989 Conn. Acts 633, 634
(codified as amended at CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 21a-278a(b) (West 2006)). The provision
was amended in 1992 to increase the distance from school to 1500 feet. Public Act No. 92-82,
1992 Conn. Acts 235, 235–36 (codified as amended at CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 21a-278a(b)
(West 2006)). To accord with the analysis quoted in State v. Denby, 668 A.2d 682 (Conn. 1995);
see infra text accompanying notes 29–36, however, I use the earlier version of section 21a278a(b). The current form of the statutory provision was enacted in 1994. Public Act No. 92-82,
§ 1(b), 1994 Conn. Acts 1061, 1062 (codified at CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 21a-278a(b) (West
2006)).
28. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 21a-277 (West 2006).
29. State v. Denby, 668 A.2d 682 (Conn. 1995).
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this question in the mens rea presumption it adopted based on the
30
MPC. It recited, “When one and only one of such [mental-state]
terms appears in a statute defining an offense, it is presumed to apply
to every element of the offense unless an intent to limit its application
31
clearly appears.” The language of the offense in light of this
32
directive, the court concluded, made its meaning unambiguous. The
offense “specifically requires a mental state of ‘intent,’ which must be
33
applied to every element of that statute.”
The “plain
34
language . . . dictates only one construction” —that the 1000-foot
requirement is a strict liability element. The prosecutor must prove
that the offense occurred within the 1000-foot zone, but she “is not,
however, required to prove that the defendant knew that this location
35
was within the zone.” This is evident from the “plain language” of
the statute, which overcomes the statutory presumption:
The mental state of knowledge that the location is within the 1000
foot zone is not set forth in § 21a-278a(b). An “intent” element is
not synonymous with a “knowledge” element, each of which is
specifically defined in the penal code. The absence of any statutory
requirement that the defendant knowingly sell within the prohibited
school zone demonstrates that the legislature did not intend to make
36
knowledge an element of the crime.

30. Id. at 685.
31. Id. (quoting CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-5 (West 1988)) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Section 53a-5 of the Connecticut Code was originally enacted by Public Act No. 828,
§ 5, 1969 Conn. Pub. Acts 1554, 1556 (codified at CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-5 (West 2007 &
Supp. 2012)), twenty-five years before the school-zone drug offense, section 21a-278a(b), was
enacted in its current form in 1994. For an example of the court establishing an interpretation of
the offense prior to the enactment of the mens rea presumption, compare Public Act No. 828,
§ 5, 1969 Conn. Pub. Acts at 1556, with Public Act No. 92-82, § 1(b), 1994 Conn. Acts at 1062.
Thus there is no issue of the court having established an interpretation of the offense prior to
enactment of the mens rea presumption.
32. Denby, 668 A.2d at 685.
33. Id. (quoting CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 21a-278a(b) (West 1988 & Supp. 1991)).
34. Id. The intermediate appellate court similarly found that “by the clear language of the
statute, such an intent is not an element of the crime.” State v. Denby, 646 A.2d 909, 913 (Conn.
App. Ct. 1994), aff’d, 668 A.2d 682 (Conn. 1995).
35. Denby, 668 A.2d at 685.
36. See id. (“If the legislature had wanted to make knowledge as to location of a school an
element of the offense, it would have done so by specifically stating . . . that the defendant knew
[he] was in, or on, or within 1000 feet of a school.”). One might explain this interpretation with
reference to the Connecticut legislature’s revision to the MPC’s definitions of mental states
when it adopted them. The legislature defined the term “intentionally” (the word that many
states substitute for the MPC’s “purposely”) solely with reference to result conduct elements,
for which intention means “conscious objective.” Public Act No. 828, § 3(9), 1969 Conn. Pub.
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Denby is a representative example of the relatively low standard
that state courts often apply to conclude that a legislative intention
for strict liability clearly appears. In contrast to the Connecticut
legislature’s relative lack of clarity in specifying a strict-liability
element, a few state legislatures that enacted both the MPC
culpability presumptions and a similar school-zone offense made their
intent to impose strict liability exceedingly clear. New Jersey’s
equivalent statute, for example, specifies that “it shall be no defense
to a prosecution for a violation of this section that the actor was
unaware that the prohibited conduct took place while on or within
37
1,000 feet of any school property.” Utah, another MPC state, did the
38
same, as did Louisiana.
The details of the Denby analysis are specific to the decision but
the holding is the same in nearly every state that adopted the MPC
39
culpability presumptions, and in non-MPC states as well. Several
other states whose codes contain both a version of this offense and
the MPC-based presumptions reached the same result, although the
clarity of their reasoning varies and differences in statutory language
40
provide some grounds for distinction.

Acts at 1555 (codified at CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-3(11) (West 2007)) (internal quotation
marks omitted). In contrast, the MPC adds (a bit awkwardly) a definition of intent with respect
to circumstances such as location: intention means one is “aware of the existence of such
circumstances or he believes or hopes that they exist.” MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(a)(ii)
(Official Draft 1985). Denby did not note the statutory definition of intention, but Connecticut’s
shorter version might help explain the court’s assumption that “intent” could not apply to the
school-zone element, forcing it to assess only whether “knowledge” was required. The absence
of a knowledge term meant, to the state court, that an exception to the mental-state
presumption “clearly appear[ed].” Denby, 668 A.2d at 685.
37. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:35-7 (West 2005 & Supp. 2012); see also State v. Morales, 539
A.2d 769, 775–76 (N.J. 1987) (holding that the strict-liability offense is constitutional).
38. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:981.3(B) (2012) (“Lack of knowledge that the prohibited
act occurred on or within two thousand feet of school or drug treatment facility property shall
not be a defense.”); UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(4)(e) (LexisNexis 2007 & Supp. 2012)
(providing that it is not a defense that the actor was unaware that the location where the act
occurred was in or near a school or within one thousand feet of a school); see also State v.
Williams, 729 So. 2d 1080, 1081–82 (La. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that the strict-liability offense is
constitutional). Several statutes in non-MPC states do the same. See, e.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS ch.
94C, § 32J (LexisNexis 2010 & Supp. 2012) (providing that it is not a defense that the actor was
unaware that the act occurred in or near a school); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 69.50.435(2)
(West 2007 & Supp. 2012) (same).
39. For examples from non-MPC states, see LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:981.3(B) (2012) and
Bateman, supra note 23.
40. In addition to cases discussed below, for Pennsylvania law, see Commonwealth v.
Murphy, 592 A.2d 750, 754–55 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991), which held that there is no mens rea
requirement for school proximity because that factor was in a sentencing guideline provision
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The Oregon Supreme Court reached the same interpretation of
its school-zone drug offense, which lacks an express culpability term.
Oregon’s statute reads: “Except as authorized [in other sections], it is
unlawful for any person to manufacture or deliver a . . . controlled
substance within 1,000 feet of the real property comprising a public or
41
private . . . school . . . . (a) [A violation] is a Class A felony . . . .” In
42
State v. Rutley, the court cited and discussed Oregon’s MPC-inspired
43
statutes that define presumptions of culpability. It quickly concluded
that a culpability requirement must be implied into the offense, but it
then focused on the mens rea provision that states, “[A] culpable
mental state is not required if . . . an offense . . . clearly indicates a
legislative intent to dispense with any culpable mental state
44
requirement for the offense or any material element thereof.” In a
move common among courts in MPC states, the court then turned to
traditional interpretive conventions—the ordinary meaning of
language and statutory purpose. The language indicates strict liability
because “the 1,000-foot distance is not logically or grammatically
separated” from other components of the offense definition, and
because the legislature’s purpose is explicitly instrumental: “to
45
protect children from drug use.” For these reasons, Rutley found
clear indications for strict liability on the element of distance from the
school.

rather than the offense definition. For Indiana law, see Walker v. State, 668 N.E.2d 243, 244–45
(Ind. 1996) and Steelman v. State, 602 N.E.2d 152, 154–56 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992), which held that
the legislature did not intend to require awareness of proximity to a school. Even though the
offense definition requires the drug offense to be committed “knowingly or intentionally,” in
reaching the strict-liability holding for the school-zone element, neither decision makes any
reference to section 35-41-2-2(d) of the Indiana Code, which states that “if a kind of culpability
is required for commission of the offense, it is required with respect to every material element,”
id.; see Saxton v. Smith, 315 S.W.3d 293, 296, 299 (Ky. 2010) (noting that neither mens rea
presumptions nor the Constitution require proof of culpability for the school-distance element
that would increase drug offense liability); State v. Smith, 48 S.W.3d 159, 165–69 (Tenn. Crim.
App. 2000) (same).
41. OR. REV. STAT. § 475.904 (2011). At the time of Rutley, this statute was codified at OR.
REV. STAT. § 475.999 (1990).
42. State v. Rutley, 171 P.3d 361 (Or. 2007).
43. Id. at 363–64 (citing OR. REV. STAT. §§ 161.095, .-105, .-115 (2005)).
44. Id. at 364 (quoting OR. REV. STAT. § 161.105(1)(b) (2005)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
45. Id. at 365. More fully: “[T]he statute at issue here required that the 1,000-foot distance
be measured from ‘the real property comprising a public or private elementary, secondary or
career school attended primarily by minors.’ In that phrase, the 1,000-foot distance is not
logically or grammatically separated from the other school-related requirements.” Id. (citation
omitted) (quoting OR. REV. STAT. § 475.999 (1999)).
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Ohio provides a final variation of how an MPC state reaches the
same conclusion. Subsection (A) of the Ohio offense defines the basic
crime: “No person shall knowingly . . . [s]ell or offer to sell a
46
controlled substance.” Subsection (C) then specifies, without
repeating “knowingly,” the grade of the offense according to a range
of factors—drug type, quantity, and proximity of the conduct to a
47
school. In interpreting this offense, the Ohio Court of Appeals in
48
State v. Ward reached the same strict-liability holding as the courts in
Denby and Rutley. And it did so with only the barest
acknowledgement of Ohio’s version of the MPC culpability
49
presumption, which states that “[w]hen the section defining an
offense does not specify any degree of culpability, and plainly
indicates a purpose to impose strict criminal liability for the conduct
50
described in the section, then culpability is not required.” Ward did
not quote this provision; it merely cited it as authority for this odd
assertion: “[T]he Ohio legislature has attached criminal liability to
criminal conduct without the requirement of a culpable mental
51
state.” Instead of describing “plain indications” to impose strict
liability, the court offered three brief rationales for the holding: the
school-proximity offense “does not criminalize otherwise innocent
52
behavior,” additional punishment serves the statute’s “purpose of
53
protecting children in schools,” and those who sell drugs near
schools even unknowingly “deserve proportionately greater
54
punishment.” The last rationale is telling; it demonstrates a judicial
conception of proportionate desert unconnected to an actor’s
culpability and determined entirely by a strict-liability circumstance
element.

46. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2925.03(A) (West 2006).
47. Id. § 2925.03(C).
48. State v. Ward, 637 N.E.2d 16 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993).
49. Id. at 19; see also State v. Harris, 623 N.E.2d 1240, 1243–44 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993) (“The
mens rea requirement is met by the knowing sale or offer to sell a controlled substance. This
fact assures that the ‘schoolyard’ provision does not ‘criminalize a broad range of apparently
innocent conduct.’ Under such circumstances, due process does not require that [defendant]
specifically knew that the drug sale in which she took part was conducted within one thousand
feet of a school.”).
50. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.21(B) (West 2006).
51. Ward, 637 N.E.2d at 19.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 18 (quoting United States v. Cross, 900 F.2d, 66, 69 (6th Cir. 1990)).
54. Id.
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In Denby, Rutley, and Ward, state courts employed various
interpretive strategies that avoid or undermine their state codes’
MPC culpability presumptions. Those decisions may represent
judicial misunderstanding of those presumptions or resistance to
them. These courts, by different rationales, applied culpability
presumptions narrowly to justify strict liability; they took from the
codification of culpability presumptions little legislative disfavor of
strict liability, even for offenses in which a legislative choice for strict
liability was not express. Alternately (or additionally), the decisions
may signal the limits of what the MPC’s interpretive canons can be
expected to achieve. General interpretive rules themselves require
interpretation, and these join a body of established interpretive
conventions that they do not fully displace. As a result, MPC-based
interpretive rules provide courts with less determinative guidance
than their legislative drafters might have expected. Every state’s
55
culpability presumption, like the MPC’s, provide for exceptions to
the presumption if legislative intent “plainly appears” or is “clearly
56
indicated.” Courts identify those occasions with the traditional tools
of statutory interpretation. They infer legislative intent, as Rutley put
it, from “indirect indicators” such as plain language, grammatical
analysis, sentence and paragraph structure, legislative history, or
57
presumed purpose. One convention, such as plain meaning in
Denby, may be sufficient to find a clearly indicated exception. But
Rutley and Ward illustrate the use of one especially important
convention that state courts very often cite, when interpreting many

55. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(4) (Official Draft 1985) (noting that an explicit
culpability term applies to all material elements “unless a contrary purpose plainly appears”).
56. See statutes cited supra Table 1.
57. See State v. Rutley, 171 P.3d 361, 365 (Or. 2007) (“[T]his court has attempted to
determine the legislature’s intent by examining the offense or element of the offense and a
variety of indirect indicators to determine whether the legislature would have had an obvious
reason or reasons to omit a culpable mental state.”). Rutley candidly noted that the legislature
had not specified whether courts should use traditional statutory-interpretation tools to
determine legislative intent under the MPC provisions; in the absence of guidance, it chose to
do so. Id. at 364.
A typical statement of statutory-interpretation protocols in the context of mens rea is
State v. Robinson, 718 P.2d 1313 (Kan. 1986):
Whether or not criminal intent or knowledge is an element of a statutory crime
depends on the will of the legislature. Legislative intent is a matter of statutory
construction, to be determined in a given case from consideration of the language of
the statute in connection with the subject matter of the prohibition, the statute’s
manifest purpose and design, and the consequences of the several constructions to
which the statute may be susceptible.
Id. at 1316.
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different statutes, to justify strict liability. That convention is for
courts to draw a strong inference of strict liability from a statute’s
instrumental purpose to protect a particular victim class or prevent a
specific harm, a purpose that courts commonly infer from a statute’s
58
text or legislative history.
The Ohio Supreme Court has a notable record of finding strictliability exceptions to the culpability presumption its legislature
59
60
adopted in 1972. In a 1981 case, State v. Wac, the court interpreted
61
Ohio’s bookmaking offense, which punishes individuals who
“[e]ngage in bookmaking, or knowingly engage in conduct that
62
facilitates bookmaking.” Mr. Wac was charged with engaging in
bookmaking, and the state supreme court addressed whether the
offense required proof of mens rea, in light of the state’s presumption
for a recklessness standard when an offense “does not specify any
degree of culpability” and does not “plainly indicate[] a purpose to
63
impose strict liability.” Wac found a plain indication for strict
liability because no culpability term accompanies “engage in
bookmaking,” but one does accompany the subsequent phrase
64
defining the facilitation offense. This is odd, in part because
bookmaking is defined as “the business of receiving or paying off
65
bets.” It is hard to imagine one doing that conduct unknowingly,
or—in recklessness terms—doing it while unaware of the risk one is
receiving or paying bets. The legislature, rather than plainly
indicating strict liability, probably sought to avoid redundancy:
66
although one always receives or pays bets knowingly, one could

58. State v. Gandhi, 989 A.2d 256 (N.J. 2010), provides another example, see id. at 271
(“[B]ased on the statutory language and the history to the statutory offense of stalking, we do
not discern a legislative intent to restrict the applicability of the anti-stalking statute to a stalkerdefendant who purposefully or knowingly intended that his course of conduct would cause a
reasonable victim to fear bodily injury or death. Rather the plain language of the statutory
offense, reasonably read, prohibits a defendant from purposefully or knowingly engaging in a
course of conduct . . . that would cause such fear in an objectively reasonable person.”).
59. Amended Substitute House Bill No. 511, § 2901.21, 1971 Ohio Laws 1866, 1897–98
(codified as amended at OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.21 (West 2006)).
60. State v. Wac, 428 N.E.2d 428 (Ohio 1981).
61. Id. at 431.62.OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2915.02(A)(1) (West 2006).
62. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2915.02(A)(1) (West 2006).
63. Id. § 2901.21(B).
64. Wac, 428 N.E.2d at 431.
65. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2915.01(A) (West 2006).
66. If one “pays a bet” knowingly, one must be unaware that one is giving money to
another, or believe that one is giving money to another for some other reason—either of which,
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easily facilitate another’s bookmaking unknowingly, for instance by
leasing property to another without knowing of his bookmaking
activity.
Wac has become an oft-cited Ohio precedent for the rule that
strict liability is “plainly indicated” when an offense includes a
culpability term in one phrase of an offense but not in another phrase
67
that specifies alternate conduct. Ohio appellate courts commonly
find further support for “plain” indications of strict liability in familiar
instrumental rationales, such as whether strict liability facilitates a
criminal statute’s deterrence purpose.
A recent strict-liability interpretation of Ohio’s aggravated
robbery offense makes the point. The offense is defined as theft,
68
which expressly requires knowledge, along with another element. In
69
State v. Lester the issue was whether “the element of brandishing,
displaying, using, or indicating possession of a deadly weapon has a
mens rea of recklessness, or whether strict liability is imposed with
70
regard to that element.” The Ohio Supreme Court in Lester held
that it did not. After considering the code’s presumption of
culpability in the absence of a mens rea term unless strict liability was
“plainly indicated,” Lester concluded the indication was plain
if true, presents an occasion for conviction of an actor for innocent conduct. The purpose of
culpability requirements is precisely to draw those distinctions and prevent that risk.
67. See, e.g., State v. Parrish, 465 N.E.2d 873, 874–75 (Ohio 1984) (per curiam) (noting that
Ohio courts have permitted strict liability when “the General Assembly has expressly
differentiated degrees of culpability” in the definition of the offense); State v. Brewer, 645
N.E.2d 120, 121–22 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994) (“The rule of law emerging from those cases is that a
statute that neither specifies that a particular mental state is necessary to commit the offense
nor plainly states that no mental state is necessary to commit the offense may nevertheless
plainly indicate a legislative intent to impose strict liability if the statute is structured so as to
proscribe an act with ‘expressly differentiated degrees of culpability.’” (quoting Parrish, 465
N.E.2d at 874–75)); State v. Ward, 637 N.E.2d 16, 19 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993) (“We reject [the
defendant’s] argument that he must additionally know he was within one thousand feet of a
school. The statute in question enhances the penalty when an additional element is proven and
does not criminalize otherwise innocent behavior, as it applies only to people already in
violation of a statute with a mens rea requirement.”); see also State v. Harris, 623 N.E.2d 1240,
1244 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993) (interpreting Ohio’s strict-liability standard regarding drug offenses
in school zones).
68. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2913.02 (West 2006) (stating that one must “knowingly
obtain or exert control over . . . [another’s] property . . . [w]ithout the consent of the owner” and
“with purpose to deprive the owner”). Ohio defines several other crimes as “[t]heft offense[s]”
which can become robbery if committed with weapons. See id. § 2913.01(K)(1) (defining “[t]heft
offense[s]” (internal quotation marks omitted)); id. §§ 2911.01 to -.02 (defining robbery and
aggravated robbery as requiring commission of a “theft offense”).
69. State v. Lester, 916 N.E.2d 1038 (Ohio 2009).
70. Id. at 1039 (interpreting OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2911.01(A)(1) (West 2006)).
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enough, although to do so the court failed to recognize that
indicating possession and brandishing a weapon are verbs that imply
intentional or knowing conduct as a matter of ordinary meaning. The
court reasoned that the amendment of the offense to add the display
and brandish terms does not establish “that the General Assembly
72
intended to require a specific mental element” —an analysis that
Justice Lanzinger, concurring in the judgment only, argued displaced
the requirement for plainly indicated strict liability with one requiring
73
a plain indication for intent. The majority’s support cited previous
74
strict-liability decisions including Wac, as well as common rationales
used to infer strict liability. Lester invoked the instrumental rationale
that the “risk of harm increases” from the conduct regardless of
75
whether it is done knowingly. And, reflecting a common judicial
rejection of the idea that culpability is linked proportionally to
liability, the court noted that the “brandishing” element does not
serve to distinguish innocent from culpable conduct, so “it is
reasonable that the General Assembly would impose strict liability on
the additional [element] that enhances the seriousness of the criminal
76
activity.” The Ohio Supreme Court employed the same reasons
more recently to affirm a strict-liability application of another clause

71. Id. at 1041–42 (internal quotation marks omitted).
72. Id. at 1042.
73. Id. at 1046 (Lanzinger, J., concurring in the judgment).
74. Id. at 1047 (“[A] culpable mental state . . . [i]s an element of facilitating bookmaking.
Nevertheless, there is no such requirement in the same subsection for bookmaking per se. This
exclusion plainly indicates a purpose to impose strict criminal liability . . . .” (quoting State v.
Wac, 428 N.E.2d 428, 431 (Ohio 1981) (internal quotation marks omitted))). Lester also relied
on State v. Wharf, 715 N.E.2d 172 (Ohio 1999), which interpreted the weapon-possession
element of the robbery statute, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.21(D)(1), as plainly indicating
strict liability, see Wharf, 715 N.E.2d at 175 (“[B]y employing language making mere possession
or control . . . , as opposed to actual use or intent to use, a violation, it is clear to us that the
General Assembly intended . . . a strict liability offense.”); see also Lester, 916 N.E.2d at 1041–42
(citing Wharf for the proposition that “[t]he element of having a deadly weapon in one’s
possession or under one’s control . . . does not . . . require that a defendant act with a specific
intent”). The Lester court’s misreading was facilitated by its failure to acknowledge that
“possession” is defined in section 2901.21(D)(1) of the Ohio Code as requiring that one
“knowingly procured or received the thing” (emphasis added).
75. Lester, 916 N.E.2d at 1043 (“From the victim’s perspective, . . . the risk of harm
increases when a defendant brandishes or displays the weapon.”). Wharf provides a more
explicit instrumental rationale. See Wharf, 715 N.E.2d at 175 (invoking the legislature’s implicit
goal “to remove the potential for harm that exists” from weapon possession during thefts and
noting that “[m]erely having the weapon is the potentially dangerous factual condition
warranting the more severe penalty” (quoting State v. Edwards, 361 N.E.2d 1083, 1086 (1976))).
76. Lester, 916 N.E.2d at 1042–43.
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in the same statute. And one finds the same reliance on instrumental
aims of protecting victims or reducing harm in other states’ strictliability
interpretations,
despite
MPC-inspired
culpability
78
presumptions.
C. Limits on Culpability Presumptions (Part Two): Restrictive
Application and Non-Acknowledgement
Another set of strategies that facilitates strict liability despite
MPC culpability presumptions merits note. One version occurred
when the Ohio Court of Appeals, in Ward, paraphrased the MPC
presumption with the proposition that the “legislature has attached
criminal liability to criminal conduct without the requirement of a
79
culpable mental state.” Sometimes courts mischaracterize, or
perhaps misunderstand, mental-state presumptions in their state
codes. But some courts simply ignore them. A Texas appellate
80
decision, Massey v. State, provides a stark example of the latter
tactic. In resolving the question of whether a sexual assault offense
includes a mental-state requirement for the victim’s age element,
which triggers a grade and sentence enhancement, the court made no
reference at all to the Texas statutes that codify mens rea rules based
81
on the MPC. Instead, it cited only a more attenuated authority from
a jurisdiction without MPC presumptions—a U.S. Supreme Court
decision interpreting a federal pornography offense—for the principle
that “[a]n additional allegation of culpable mental state is not

77. See State v. Horner, 935 N.E.2d 26 (Ohio 2010) (interpreting OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2911.01(A)(3) (West 2006)). In Horner, intentional injury would have been easy to prove. See
id. at 29 (noting that the defendants “beat the victims and robbed them of cash”). Likewise,
intent on the weapon elements would have been easy to prove in Wharf and Lester. Mr. Wharf
pointed his rifle at the police before he was shot by them. Wharf, 715 N.E.2d at 173. Mr. Lester
pointed a knife at a victim and said, “I will cut you.” Lester, 916 N.E.2d at 1039 (quoting Lester)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
78. See, e.g., Gorman v. People, 19 P.3d 662, 666–67 (Colo. 2000) (citing, inter alia, the
statute’s purpose to protect victims as a reason not to infer a requirement that the defendant
know a minor’s age in the offense of “contributing to the delinquency of a minor,” COLO. REV.
STAT. § 18-6-701 (1999), although the court inferred a knowledge requirement for the conduct
that constitutes “contributing to delinquency,” in this case facilitating illegal drug sales).
79. State v. Ward, 637 N.E.2d 16, 19 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993).
80. Massey v. State, 933 S.W.2d 582 (Tex. Ct. App. 1996).
81. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 6.02 (West 2011) (establishing the basic mens rea
requirements); id. § 6.03 (defining culpable mental states).
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required for such an aggravating element.” Massey is not singular in
83
this respect.
Additionally, courts find more forceful ways to narrowly
84
interpret culpability presumptions than in Denby, in which the
court’s inference of clear legislative intent for strict liability did all of
85
the work. Some courts define offense components with labels that
make the presumptions inapplicable. This was the Illinois court’s
tactic to reach the same strict-liability holding as Denby, Rutley, and
Ward for the Illinois school-zone element of the drug offense. In
86
People v. Pacheco, the Illinois appellate court’s analysis concluded
that school proximity was not an element of the offense. It was instead
“only an enhancing factor used to elevate the level of the felony to a
87
Class 1 felony,” and the state code’s interpretive presumptions speak
82. Massey, 933 S.W.2d at 584 (citing United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64,
72 n.3 (1994)). For a contrasting decision from another MPC state, see People v. Ryan, 626
N.E.2d 51, 55 (N.Y. 1993), superseded by statute, Act of June 10, 1995, 1995 N.Y. Laws 2180
(codified as amended at N.Y. PENAL LAW § 220.18 (McKinney 2008)). Ryan relied on codified
mens rea presumptions, N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.15 (McKinney 1992), to hold that an offense
prohibiting knowing possession of 625 mg of a hallucinogen, id. § 220.18(5), requires proof that
offender had knowledge of the weight of the drug—an element defined in a subsection of the
law that increases the sentencing range, Ryan, 626 N.E.2d at 54–55; see also N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 220.18 (McKinney 2008) (specifying the circumstances under which “[a] person is guilty of
criminal possession of a controlled substance in the second degree”).
83. For example, the New Jersey Supreme Court in State v. Smith, 963 A.2d 281 (N.J.
2009), did not discuss section 2C:2-2 of the New Jersey Code, which requires a mental state for
all terms unless contrary purpose plainly appears. Although noting that the firearm-possession
statute, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:39-3(d) (West 2007), is susceptible to “two plausible
interpretations,” the court found that strict liability applied to the element that the gun be
defaced, Smith, 963 A.2d at 285, 289. Similarly, State v. Baker, 636 S.W.2d 902 (Mo. 1982), did
not discuss Missouri’s culpability presumption, MO. ANN. STAT. § 562.021 (West 1978), in
finding circumstantial evidence sufficient to prove that the defendant knew the murder victim’s
status as a law-enforcement officer; the court also declined to address “the unscrutable question
of mens rea,” Baker, 636 S.W.2d at 907. Here, the jury was not instructed to find knowledge. Id.;
see also Gluck, supra note 24, at 1787–91 (describing Texas Court of Criminal Appeals decisions
that ignore and contradict other codified interpretive rules).
84. See, e.g., Gorman v. People, 19 P.3d 662, 666–67 (Colo. 2000) (declining to infer a mens
rea requirement as to the victim’s age, but inferring it as to the conduct element).
85. See supra notes 34–36 and accompanying text.
86. People v. Pacheco, 666 N.E.2d 370 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996).
87. Id. at 376 (emphasis added); see also People v. Brooks, 648 N.E.2d 626, 628–30 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1995) (interpreting the drug offense statute for offenses committed within one
thousand feet of public housing and holding that mental-state requirements do not extend to
“[e]nhancing provisions” because they only “concern consequences of the offense which make
[the offense] more serious”). Pacheco drew no inference from the fact that the basic drug
offense is codified in one section of the Illinois Code, 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 570/401 (West
1994), whereas the enhancement (committing the offense near a school) is separately codified in
section 570/407(b).
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only to culpability requirements “with respect to each element
88
described by the statute defining the offense.” The court embraced
this approach more recently for another offense. In People v.
89
Stanley, the statute read: “A person who possesses any firearm upon
which any such importer’s or manufacturer’s serial number has been
90
changed, altered, removed or obliterated commits a Class 3 felony.”
Stanley’s strained interpretation “discern[ed] that the elements of this
offense are properly [1] the mens rea and [2] the
possession . . . . Though the defacement unmistakably bears upon the
91
commission of the offense, it is not an element of the offense.”
Although an “enhancing factor” is not used or defined in the Illinois
penal code, this distinction between factors and elements, which
92
limits culpability requirements to elements, has persisted. And it has
done so despite the Illinois Supreme Court’s earlier holding that a
Some states expressly treat such aggravating facts as strict-liability sentencing factors,
as Pennsylvania does with its school-zone drug offense, by placing the school-zone factor in its
sentencing guidelines. See 35 PA. STAT. ANN. § 780-113 (West 2003 & Supp. 2012) (defining
drug offenses); 204 PA. CODE § 303.10 (2012) (providing for a sentence enhancement for
offenses in school zones); see also Commonwealth v. Murphy, 592 A.2d 750, 754–55 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1991) (holding that there is no mens rea requirement for proximity to a school zone because
that fact is in the sentencing guidelines rather than the offense definition). The clarity of
Pennsylvania’s grading and sentencing rule here says nothing about the soundness of its grading
distinctions generally, which a careful study has ranked below average. See Paul H. Robinson,
Michael T. Cahill & Usman Mohammad, The Five Worst (and Five Best) American Criminal
Codes, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 51, 60 (ranking Pennsylvania’s code as below average in the
“grading liability and punishment” category but “above average” in other categories).
88. Pacheco, 666 N.E.2d at 375 (emphasis omitted) (quoting 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
5/4-3(a) (West 1994)).
89. People v. Stanley, 921 N.E.2d 445 (Ill. Ct. App. 2010).
90. Id. at 451 (quoting 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/24-5(b) (West 2006)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
91. Id. at 454 (emphasis added); see also State v. Jordan, 733 N.E.2d 601, 607 (Ohio 2000)
(holding that, for the offense of unlawful possession of dangerous ordnance, the state does not
need to prove that the defendant knew that the shotgun’s barrel length was less than eighteen
inches).
92. Although there is no reference to enhancing factors in the interpretive provisions or
elsewhere in the Illinois penal code, a state supreme court rule refers to factors that enhance a
sentence in a provision that defines sentencing procedures. See ILL. S. CT. R. 451(g) (“When the
death penalty is not being sought and the State intends, for the purpose of sentencing, to rely on
one or more sentencing enhancement factors . . . the court may, within its discretion, conduct a
unitary trial through verdict on the issue of guilt and on the issue of whether a sentencing
enhancement factor exists.”); see also 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/111-3(c) (West 2006 &
Supp. 2012) (listing charging requirements for prosecutors pursuing enhanced sentences). For
another example of an Illinois decision deciding whether an offense clause is an element or an
enhancing factor, see People v. Zimmerman, 942 N.E.2d 1228 (Ill. 2010), which concluded that a
clause in the statute defining the offense was an element and not a sentence-enhancement
factor, id. at 1234.
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fact that raised theft from a misdemeanor to a felony is an element of
that offense, with the result that the government must prove that
93
element at trial rather than merely address it in a sentencing hearing.
D. Counterexamples: Taking Culpability Presumptions Seriously
Not every state court adopts rationales to avoid legislative
codification of culpability presumptions. Some courts take the
enactment of these provisions as indicating legislative preference for
mental-state requirements, and they apply them even with respect to
statutes whose language, structure, or implied purpose would support
strict-liability holdings in other jurisdictions and under non-MPC
interpretive conventions. Despite its strict-liability decision in Rutley
on the school-zone drug offense, the Oregon Supreme Court earlier
94
in State v. Blanton relied on presumptions in its state code to
establish a culpability requirement to an age element in another drug
95
offense. Moreover, it did so when the culpability term “knowingly”
appeared in the statute’s first subsection and the minor’s age element
96
was placed in the fourth, a structure that could be read to indicate
strict liability. The separate age-element section increased the felony
grade of the offense, but unlike Illinois and Ohio courts, Blanton
97
inferred no distinction for “non-elements” or “enhancing factors.”
Its reasoning relied entirely on Oregon’s MPC-based statute, in which
a “prescribed culpable mental state applies to each material element
98
of the offense that necessarily requires a culpable mental state.”
Blanton found that the italicized clause (a revision of the MPC
adopted by several states) to be “confusing” but concluded that
93. People v. Hicks, 518 N.E.2d 148, 150 (Ill. 1987), superseded by statute, Public Act 86964, 1989 Ill. Laws 6509 (codified as amended at 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/111-3 (West 2006
& Supp. 2012)).
94. State v. Blanton, 588 P.2d 28, 29 (Or. 1978) (en banc).
95. Id. at 29–30. Blanton, age twenty-one, was accused of providing marijuana to a
seventeen-year-old. Id. at 29.
96. Id. At the time of Blanton, the statute read:
(1) A person commits the offense of criminal activity in drugs if he knowingly and
unlawfully . . . furnishes . . . a narcotic or dangerous drug.
(2) . . . [C]riminal activity in drugs is a Class B felony . . . .
(4) . . . [I]f the defendant is 18 years of age or over and the conviction is for furnishing
a narcotic or dangerous drug to a person under 18 years of age and who is at least
three years younger than the defendant, criminal activity in drugs is a Class A felony.
Act of Mar. 12, 1974, § 2, 1974 Or. Laws Spec. Sess. 167, 168 (codified at OR. REV. STAT.
§ 167.207 (1974)), repealed by Act effective July 1, 1978, 1977 Or. Laws 701.
97. See Blanton, 588 P.2d at 29–30.
98. OR. REV. STAT. § 161.115(1) (2011) (emphasis added).
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culpability was “necessarily require[d]” for all elements save those for
99
“jurisdiction, venue and the like” —a reading that strengthens the
provision’s presumption for mental-state requirements. Instead of
emphasizing an instrumental protective purpose from the offense
definition, Blanton emphasized the legislative intent of the MPCbased culpability presumption, which it read as displacing the
common-law canon actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea. “A policy
against criminal liability without fault need not go so far as to protect
a culpable defendant from an unanticipated extent of liability,” the
court reasoned, but “the policy adopted by the legislature is to
require a culpable mental state with respect to each element in the
100
definition of an offense.” Much more recently, the Oregon appellate
101
court read another youth-endangerment drug crime the same way.
102
A few other states had done so in the pre-MPC era.
One MPC jurisdiction did the same even with its school-zone
drug offense. Missouri codifies the school-zone element in a separate
section from the basic drug offense and lacks an express culpability
term:
A person commits the offense [as prohibited in another section] of
distribution of a controlled substance near schools if such person
violates section 195.211 by unlawfully distributing or delivering any
controlled substance to a person in or on, or within two thousand
feet of, the real property comprising a public or private elementary
or secondary school, public vocational school, or a public or private
103
community college, college or university or on any school bus.

99. Blanton, 588 P.2d at 29 (quoting State v. Blanton, 570 P.2d 411, 413 (Or. Ct. App.
1977), aff’d, 588 P.2d 28 (Or. 1978)) (internal quotation marks omitted). In a later decision, the
Oregon Court of Appeals was more blunt, labeling the clause “gibberish.” State v. Rutley, 123
P.3d 334, 335 (Or. Ct. App. 2005), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 171 P.3d 361 (Or. 2007).
100. Blanton, 588 P.2d at 29.
101. See State v. Dixon, 83 P.3d 385, 387–88 (Or. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that mens rea
applies to age in section 163.175(1) of the Oregon Code, which specifies liability for one who
“knowingly . . . [p]ermits a person under 18 years of age to enter or remain in a place where
unlawful activity involving controlled substances is maintained or conducted”). But see State v.
Rainoldi, 268 P.3d 568, 579 (Or. 2011) (en banc) (reversing the court below by holding that
proof of the defendant’s culpability regarding his felony status was not required).
102. See Kourie, supra note 23, § 4[b] (citing the following cases as requiring mens rea for
the age of the victim: Chambers v. State, 215 N.E.2d 544 (Ind. 1966); State v. Friedman, 74
N.E.2d 285 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 1947); McGowan v. State, 173 P.2d 227 (Okla. Crim. App. 1947),
rev’d on reh’g, 176 P.2d 837 (Okla. Crim. App. 1947); and Gottlieb v. Commonwealth, 101 S.E.
872 (Va. 1920)).
103. MO. ANN. STAT. § 195.214 (West 2011). A violation raises the basic offense from a
class B to a class A felony. For the basic class B drug offense, see id. § 195.211.
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The Missouri Court of Appeals in State v. White found the
mens rea question settled by the state’s MPC-based statute that
directs, “[I]f the definition of any offense does not expressly prescribe
a culpable mental state for any elements of the offense, a culpable
mental state is nonetheless required and is established if a person acts
105
purposely or knowingly.” That command, the court held, meant the
state must prove a defendant’s mental state as to the school-zone
106
element. It continued, “[I]n order for a defendant to be found
guilty . . . , he must have acted purposely or knowingly. A person acts
‘knowingly’ . . . when, concerning his conduct or attendant
circumstances, he is aware of the nature of his conduct or that those
107
circumstances exist.” The legislature’s placement of the basic
offense and school-zone enhancement in separate sections did not
affect the court’s mens rea analysis. Neither did the statute’s purpose
to protect youth from drug markets, nor did the culpability
provision’s failure to specify that implicit mental-state requirements
apply to all elements just as explicit ones do. Missouri’s
interpretation, however, is a singular outlier for these school-zone
108
drug statutes. Apparently no other state, MPC or non-MPC, has
interpreted a similar drug offense to require proof of mens rea as to
109
school proximity.
104. State v. White, 28 S.W.3d 391 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000), mandate recalled by 70 S.W.2d 644
(Mo. Ct. App. 2002).
105. Id. at 396 (quoting MO. REV. STAT. § 562.021(3) (1999) (internal quotation marks
omitted). The Missouri statute also dictates that “reckless or criminally negligent acts do not
establish such culpable mental state.” MO. ANN. STAT. § 562.021(3) (West 2012). This statute is
based on MPC § 2.02(3), see supra note 18, but departs from it by defining the minimum
culpability to be inferred as knowledge rather than recklessness.
106. White, 28 S.W.3d at 396 (discussing the culpability requirements as they apply to the
offense of distributing a controlled substance in school zone, MO. REV. STAT. § 195.214 (1999)).
107. Id. at 396 (quoting MO. REV. STAT. § 562.016(3) (1999)); see also State v. Crooks, 64
S.W.3d 887, 890 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002) (explaining that, with regard to the same statute, “the state
must prove that . . . the sale was within 2000 feet of a school” and that this sale was completed
“knowingly with regard to all of the facts and circumstances”).
108. For more on Missouri courts’ interpretation of mens rea requirements, including a
discussion of recent changes, see generally Wyrsch & Cook, supra note 23. For Oregon, in
addition to Rutley, see State v. Jones, 196 P.3d 97 (Or. Ct. App. 2008), which “conclude[d] that
the legislature did not intend to require the state to prove a defendant’s intent to steal property
worth at least $750 in order to convict him of first-degree theft,” id. at 102.
109. The Washington Supreme Court, however, has held that its state statute requires proof
of a culpable mental state when the school has an educational program on an upper floor of a
commercial building with no public indication of its status as a school. See State v. Akers, 965
P.2d 1078, 1079 (Wash. 1998) (“[T]he State’s evidence was insufficient to show that [defendant]
had a readily ascertainable means of determining that he was in a school zone at the time of the
drug transaction . . . .”). In other applications, Washington’s statute does not require mens rea.
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More broadly, Oregon and Missouri are outliers in the degree to
which MPC presumptions lead them to avoid strict-liability
110
holdings. Despite a few strong applications of MPC culpability rules
111
elsewhere, state court interpretations of mental-state requirements
under MPC rules mostly go the other way. Two primary impressions
emerge from this survey of case law in MPC states. One is that, as an
analytical matter, legislative specifications of culpability presumptions
have not simplified statutory construction by displacing judicial use of
other interpretive canons on mens rea questions. The second
conclusion is more substantive: MPC-inspired statutory presumptions
have proven to be weak mechanisms for shifting courts away from
inferring strict liability in criminal offenses, even for elements that are
the sole basis for increasing the felony offense grade and punishment
severity.
E. Reasons for the Weak Effect of Culpability Presumptions
1. Legislative Drafting. Before taking a closer look at state MPCbased statutes for more explanations of this trend, there are a couple
of reasons for the modest effect—or in some settings the failure—of
the MPC culpability provisions. One is a product of legislative choice:
state legislatures commonly have failed to follow MPC drafting
conventions for crime definitions in the wake of adopting MPC
general provisions on culpability in their codes. As a result, state
offense definitions often are less clear than the MPC as to whether
mental-state requirements apply to certain elements, especially those

See State v. Johnson, 68 P.3d 290, 295 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003) (“The statute provides that it is no
defense to a prosecution for violation of the statute that the defendant is unaware the
prohibited activity occurred inside a drug free zone.”); State v. Davis, 970 P.2d 336, 338 (Wash.
Ct. App. 1999) (“[A] defendant’s knowledge of a school bus stop location is not required;
rather, the mere existence of the stop is sufficient to warrant the sentencing enhancement.”). On
the overwhelming trend to interpret such statutes without mens rea on the proximity element,
see Bateman, supra note 23, §§ 6, 31, 31.5. One state, South Carolina, amended its statute in
2010 expressly to add a knowledge requirement. See Omnibus Crime Reduction and Sentencing
Reform Act of 2010, No. 273, § 39, 2010 S.C. Acts 1937, 2009 (codified at S.C. CODE ANN. § 4453-445(B) (Supp. 2011)) (“For a person to be convicted of an offense pursuant to subsection
(A), the person must: (1) have knowledge that he is in, on, or within a one-half mile radius of
the grounds of a public or private elementary, middle, or secondary school . . . .”).
110. Oregon, however, has at least one decision to the contrary. See State v. Rainoldi, 268
P.3d 568, 579 (Or. 2011) (en banc) (holding that proof of the defendant’s culpability regarding
his felony status was not required).
111. New York may be another state in which MPC-based culpability presumptions have a
notable effect on state-court decisions. See supra note 82.
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112

in separate subsections. Poor drafting makes a state’s culpability
113
provisions harder to apply; courts are less confident that exceptions
will be truly explicit, so they resort more readily to common-law
interpretive canons in search of statutory meaning and set a lower bar
for “plain” indications of strict liability. Furthermore, some MPC
states, including Ohio and Illinois, did not adopt the MPC provision
that specifies how culpability requirements apply to grading
114
elements, which may give their courts further basis to invoke a
traditional convention that mens rea does not attach to an
“aggravating element” or “enhancing factor.” This convention may
undermine the basic code provisions defining a presumption of mens
rea in the absence of any such term.
The last point supports a broader observation: even MPCinfluenced legislatures that enacted the primary culpability
presumptions may be neither as fully committed to mens rea
requirements for all offense elements as codification of those
presumptions might suggest, nor as committed to that position as
advocates of the correspondence principle and the MPC are. Even
when a legislature adopts these key provisions from the MPC, it does
so in the context of a preexisting body of interpretive law and
115
substantive criminal law. MPC adoptions often occur without
accompanying codification of all supporting provisions in the MPC,

112. For detailed accounts of haphazard, ambiguous, and inconsistent offense drafting in the
wake of a state’s earlier MPC-based revision of its criminal code, see generally Paul H.
Robinson, Thomas Gaeta, Matthew Majarian, Megan Schultz & Douglas M. Weck, The Modern
Irrationalities of American Criminal Codes: An Empirical Study of Offense Grading, 100 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 709 (2010), which examines the Pennsylvania Code, and ILL. CRIM.
CODE REWRITE & REFORM COMM’N, FINAL REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS CRIMINAL CODE
REWRITE AND REFORM COMMISSION (2003), available at https://www.law.upenn.edu/fac/
phrobins/illinois/IL%20final%20report%20Vol1.pdf, which examines the Illinois Code. For an
example of the MPC’s clarity in defining mens rea across a statute with multiple subsections, see
its definition of “theft by deception,” which requires a culpable mental state of “purposely” in
the chapeau of the offense definition, thus applying it to the four subsections that follow.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.3 (Official Draft 1985).
113. Part of the blame might be the ALI’s: the MPC contains no model offenses for drug
crimes.
114. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04(2) (“[I]gnorance or mistake of the defendant shall
reduce the grade and degree of the offense of which [the defendant] may be convicted to those
of the offense of which [the defendant] would be guilty had the situation been as [the defendant]
supposed.”).
115. Some states revised many of their specific crime definitions when they took up MPCinspired code revision projects, but many took a more piecemeal approach. All state criminal
codes later added many more crimes than the MPC contains, including in many areas that the
MPC did not contemplate, most notably drug crimes.

BROWN IN PRINTER PROOF FINAL REVISED (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

10/29/2012 10:02 AM

PERSISTENCE OF STRICT LIABILITY

315

116

such as the grading-elements provision. Furthermore, a culpability
presumption in a real-world setting may legitimately be understood to
mean something different from the same provision in the MPC itself.
One reason for the modest influence of MPC-based culpability
presumptions in state codes, then, may be that their adoption, without
further and continuing indications of legislative commitment to their
motivating principles, is an insufficient signal of a state’s commitment
to the MPC’s culpability premises, particularly the proportional link
117
of punishment to individual fault.
These indications of a
legislature’s commitment to the strength of its own MPC
presumptions draw additional support, as described more in the next
Part, from many states’ revisions of the MPC’s formulation of the
general-part culpability rules.
2.
Judicial Role—Inferring Intent Versus Enforcing Prior
Commitments. Conventions of statutory interpretation reflect a
particular vision of how courts should defer to the democratic
legitimacy of legislatures. Traditional canons mostly aim to help
courts determine and facilitate legislative intent even when intent is
not clear. That vision of legislative deference entails a weaker
presumption in favor of culpability requirements than the MPC
118
provisions do. In deferring to legislatures, courts making every
116. I identified code sections equivalent to the MPC grading provision in only three of the
twenty-four MPC states. See HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 702-211 (LexisNexis 2007) (“When the
grade or class of a particular offense depends on whether it is committed intentionally,
knowingly, recklessly, or negligently, its grade or class shall be the lowest for which the
determinative state of mind is established with respect to any element of the offense.”); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-2(e) (West 2005) (containing equivalent language); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 9A.08.010(3) (West 2009 & Supp. 2012) (same).
117. Courts sometimes note legislative acquiescence to judicial interpretations of statutes.
See, e.g., State v. Smith, 963 A.2d 281, 285 (N.J. 2009) (“When, after a long period, the
Legislature does not act to amend a statute to contradict our interpretation, then we may
presume its acquiescence to the construction given to the provision.”).
118. The primary interpretive rules in favor of mens rea terms include the presumption that
crimes require some “union of act and intent,” see generally LAFAVE, supra note 18, § 6.3(a)
(“With those crimes which require some mental fault (whether intention, knowledge,
recklessness, or negligence) in addition to an act or omission, it is a basic premise of AngloAmerican criminal law that the physical conduct and the state of mind must concur.”); that strict
liability is generally limited to “public welfare” or “regulatory” offenses, see United States v.
Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 280 (1943) (“[The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, ch. 653, 52
Stat. 1040 (1938) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 301–392 (1940))] dispenses with the conventional
requirement for criminal conduct—awareness of some wrongdoing. In the interest of the larger
good it puts the burden of acting at hazard upon a person otherwise innocent but standing in
responsible relation to a public danger.”); and that statutes codifying common-law crimes
implicitly require the mens rea required at common law, see Morissette v. United States, 342

BROWN IN PRINTER PROOF FINAL REVISED (DO NOT DELETE)

316

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

10/29/2012 10:02 AM

[Vol. 62:285

effort to determine a statute’s intended meaning set a comparatively
low bar for how clear a legislature’s rejection of a mens rea
presumption must be, because courts might be confident that they can
determine intent even when it is not clear.
By contrast, codification of mens rea presumptions should
strengthen an inference of culpability requirements in ambiguous
statutes and lead courts to require greater drafting clarity before
finding that legislators intended to reject that presumption in a
particular code section—more clarity than courts were able to find in
decisions like Denby, Rutley, or Ward when using traditional canons.
The New Jersey statute is an example of the clarity courts could
119
require to avoid the general presumption of mens rea. By requiring
greater clarity, courts’ interpretive process should serve to discipline
legislative drafting and thereby reduce ambiguity regarding legislative
intent. Requiring greater clarity would also hold the legislature to its
own prior, codified commitment for culpability requirements for all
120
offense elements, unless clearly rejected in a particular instance.
MPC-inspired mens rea rules, in short, shift the institutional role
of courts in the statutory-interpretation process. Under such rules,
courts defer to legislatures not by making all efforts to infer intended
meaning from particular offense definitions but by adhering to the
legislature’s general presumption of mens rea for all elements, as well
as holding the legislature itself to that presumption. As the MPC
intended, this approach would simplify judicial interpretation and
make statutory meaning clearer and more predictable. Explanations
for why many courts have not embraced this role, as discussed in Part
IV, include the normative appeal of the strict-liability outcomes
reached through traditional interpretive canons and courts’
tendencies to join (or inability to resist) the political trend of the last
generation toward harsher criminal law. In some MPC states,
however, a simpler explanation may share some credit: the next Part
surveys the explicit choices that many MPC-inspired legislatures
made to retain strict liability and weaken general presumptions for
culpability requirements.
U.S. 246, 251 (1952) (“As the states codified the common law of crimes, even if their enactments
were silent on the subject [of mens rea], their courts assumed that the omission did not signify
disapproval of the principle but merely recognized that intent was so inherent in the idea of the
offense that it required no statutory affirmation.”).
119. See supra note 37.
120. Although, again, how strongly one can infer this dictate from a legislature’s adoption of
MPC provisions is debatable.

BROWN IN PRINTER PROOF FINAL REVISED (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

10/29/2012 10:02 AM

PERSISTENCE OF STRICT LIABILITY

317

II. LEGISLATIVE SUPPORT FOR STRICT LIABILITY
Part II takes a closer look at variations among the twenty-four
MPC states in their legislative commitment to the correspondence
principle. It does so by highlighting several statutory departures from
121
the MPC version of mens rea presumptions. Although many states
revised the MPC’s language when adopting provisions for their own
codes, only a few states adopted the MPC’s culpability provisions
122
nearly verbatim. Many states’ language modifications are not
substantive. I categorize twelve of the twenty-four as strong MPC
states because their codes include substantive equivalents to the
MPC’s presumption of mens rea when a crime definition lacks an
explicit mental-state term and the presumption that express terms
apply to all offense elements. The other half of MPC states either lack
a statute codifying one of these presumptions or (in two cases,
Arizona and Colorado) notably weaken the mens rea inference in the
absence of an explicit requirement. In what follows, I identify and
distinguish some of the most common and substantial alternatives or
omissions regarding mens rea presumptions. I then highlight state
codes that explicitly expand applications of strict liability in specific
statutes, so as to trump any general presumption of a culpability
requirement.
A. State Revisions to the MPC Culpability Presumptions
The most notable means by which MPC states weaken mens rea
requirements in comparison to the MPC is by failing to adopt one of
the two presumptions for culpability requirements. Holding aside the
123
twelve strongest states, which do include both provisions, two others
121. The relevant MPC provisions remain § 2.02(3), § 2.02(4), and § 2.02(1). See supra note
9.
122. Examples of codes that are the closest to the MPC include DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11,
§§ 243–264 (2007); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 702-204, -207 (LexisNexis 2007); and 18 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 103, 302, 305 (West 1998 & Supp. 2012).
123. ALA. CODE § 13A-2 to -4(b) (LexisNexis 2005); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 5-2-203(a)–(b),
-204 (2006); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 243–264 (2007); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 702-204,
-207 (LexisNexis 2007); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/4-3, 5/4-9 (West 2002 & Supp. 2012); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 21-5202 (Supp. 2011); MO. ANN. STAT. § 562.026(2) (West 2012); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2C:2-2(c)(3) (West 2005); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.15(2) (McKinney 2009); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 12.1-02-02 (2012); OR. REV. STAT. § 161.105(1) (2011); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 302(d)
(West 1998).
Ohio’s provision, however, lacks MPC § 2.02(4)’s clear direction that express mentalstate requirements presumptively apply to all elements, substituting instead language that “[t]he
person has the requisite degree of culpability for each element as to which a culpable mental
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(Arizona and Colorado) codify both presumptions but explicitly
weaken the presumption of mens rea when an offense includes no
124
express culpability term. The remaining ten states lack any version
of one of the two MPC presumptions. Five of the remaining states
include only the presumption to imply mens rea when no such term is
included in an offense; they do not have any equivalent to MPC
§ 2.02(4)’s presumption that an express mens rea term applies to all
125
elements of the offense unless a statute clearly specifies otherwise.
Four states do the opposite: they include a presumption that express
terms apply to all elements but fail to dictate a presumption of mens
126
rea when no mens rea term is present. Finally, Kentucky stands
alone among the twenty-four, arguably such that it should not be
counted as an MPC state: it lacks any presumption about the reach of
express mens rea terms and includes only a weak presumption for
127
mens rea when no term is apparent. These groups are summarized
in Table 2.

state is specified by the section defining the offense.” OHIO REV. CODE § 2901.21(A)(2) (West
2006) (emphasis added).
124. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-202(B) (2010) (“If a statute defining an offense does not
expressly prescribe a culpable mental state that is sufficient for commission of the offense, no
culpable mental state is required for the commission of such offense, and the offense is one of
strict liability unless the proscribed conduct necessarily involves a culpable mental state. If the
offense is one of strict liability, proof of a culpable mental state will also suffice to establish
criminal responsibility.”); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-503(2) (2012) (“Although no culpable
mental state is expressly designated in a statute defining an offense, a culpable mental state may
nevertheless be required for the commission of that offense, or with respect to some or all of the
material elements thereof, if the proscribed conduct necessarily involves such a culpable mental
state.”).
125. ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.610 (2010); OHIO REV. CODE § 2901.21(B) (West 2006); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 39-11-301 (2010); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 6.02 (West 2011); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 76-2-102 (LexisNexis 2008).
126. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-5 (West 2007); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-41-2-2 (d)
(LexisNexis 2009); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. 17-A, § 34 (2006); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 626:2
(LexisNexis 2007).
127. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 501.030(2) (West 2006) (“A person is not guilty of a
criminal offense unless . . . [h]e has engaged in such conduct intentionally, knowingly, wantonly
or recklessly as the law may require, with respect to each element of the offense . . . .”); id.
§ 501.040 (noting that offenses lacking an express mental-state requirement “may” require
culpability for “some or all of the material elements”); see also Saxton v. Commonwealth, 315
S.W.3d 293, 299 (Ky. 2010) (interpreting the latter statute to mean that “even within the Penal
Code, there is recognition that a culpable mental state may not be required as to an element of
the offense”).
The Connecticut legislature’s official Comment attached to section 53a-5 of the
Connecticut Code states that “whether a mental state is required is a question of statutory
construction, depending on the general scope of the act and the nature of the evils to be
avoided.” CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-5 cmt. (1971).
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 Equivalent to MPC
presumptions for
express mens rea
terms;
 Presumption to imply
missing mens rea terms
 Presumption for
express terms;
 Weak presumption to
imply missing terms

Twelve: Alabama,
Arkansas, Delaware,
Illinois, Hawaii, Kansas,
Missouri, New Jersey,
New York, North Dakota,
Oregon, Pennsylvania
Two: Arizona, Colorado

Moderate

 Presumption to imply
missing terms;
 No presumption for
express terms

Five: Alaska, Ohio,
Tennessee, Texas, Utah

Moderate

 Presumption for
express terms;
 No presumption to
imply missing terms

Four: Connecticut,
Indiana, Maine, New
Hampshire

Weakest

 No presumption for
express terms;
 Weak presumption to
imply missing terms

One: Kentucky

Strong

The language by which some states weaken the implication of
mens rea bears note. Arizona, Colorado, and Kentucky all employ
the same alternative provision that explicitly preserves the legitimacy
of strict-liability offenses. Colorado’s substitute for MPC § 2.02(3)
reads:
Although no culpable mental state is expressly designated[,] . . . a
culpable mental state may nevertheless be required . . . with respect
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to some or all of the material elements . . . , if the proscribed conduct
128
necessarily involves such a culpable mental state.

Several other states employ effectively the same language but
then also strengthen the presumption for mens rea by specifying that
legislative intent for strict liability must be clear or plain. Alabama’s
version is representative. Following language similar to Colorado’s, it
adds: “A statute defining a crime, unless clearly indicating a legislative
129
intent to impose strict liability, states a crime of mental culpability.”
I coded these states with these provisions as adopting a strong
presumption to imply mens rea, but this alternative language seems to
be open to more ambiguity than the MPC: courts might view strict
liability as not “clearly indicated” in a given offense yet also not find
culpability to be “necessarily involved” in some element. Even under
the MPC’s clearer language, courts find the need for common-law
interpretive canons to resolve whether strict liability is plainly
130
intended for a given offense.
Many MPC states departed from the MPC culpability template
131
in other ways that are not critical to emphasize here. The point to
take is that even in the twenty-four states broadly categorized as MPC
jurisdictions, roughly half of the state courts start with some

128. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-503(2) (2012) (emphasis added); see also ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 13-202(B) (2010) (containing language identical to the Colorado statute); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 501.040 (West 2006) (same). Given the wording of the Colorado statute, a
decision such as Gorman v. People, 19 P.3d 662 (Colo. 2000), has a more plausible claim of
adhering to legislative intent. See supra notes 78, 84.
129. ALA. CODE § 13A-2-4(b) (LexisNexis 2005) (emphasis added); see also N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2C:2-2(c)(3) (West 2005) (employing equivalent language); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.15(2)
(McKinney 2009) (same); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 6.02(b) (West 2011) (same); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 76-2-102 (LexisNexis 2008) (same). But see OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.21(B) (West
2006) (“When the section defining an offense does not specify any degree of culpability, and
plainly indicates a purpose to impose strict criminal liability for the conduct described in the
section, then culpability is not required . . . .”).
130. See, e.g., State v. Bryant, 15 A.3d 865, 870–72 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2011) (using
plain language and legislative history to conclude that the legislature intended a strict-liability
element in the child-endangerment statute, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:24-4 (West 2005)). Oregon’s
code also employs the “necessarily required” language to restrict application of explicit terms,
OR. REV. STAT. § 161.115(1)–(2) (2011), but, as noted above, its supreme court reduced that
route for strict liability, see supra notes 94–101 and accompanying text.
131. For example, Missouri and New Jersey made knowledge, rather than recklessness, the
standard to imply in statutes lacking a mental-state term. MO. ANN. STAT. § 562.021(3) (West
2012); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2(c)(3) (West 2005). Oregon did the opposite, allowing mere
negligence to be the inferred culpability level. OR. REV. STAT. § 161.115(1), (2) (2011). The sole
Texas provision governing mens rea specifies a culpability presumption for conduct but does not
mention result or circumstance elements. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 6.02 (West 2011).
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indications from their legislatures—sometimes modest, sometimes
substantial—that strict-liability elements or offenses are more likely
to be found in the state code than in those states that fully codified
the MPC culpability presumptions. This variation explains little of the
trend of state decisions surveyed in Part I. The Connecticut court in
Denby, for example, declined to extend an express mens rea term to a
statutory element even though Connecticut’s code includes the
MPC’s culpability presumptions. And Ohio’s long line of strictliability interpretations is governed by that state’s strong presumption
to imply missing mens rea terms; the absence of a presumption to
extend express terms to all elements did not matter in most of those
132
decisions. Nonetheless, the statutory variation does not seem to
fully account for variations in judicial interpretations. Ohio’s long
record of strict-liability decisions is probably more extensive than its
MPC modifications require. The Oregon code’s departures from the
MPC example are greater than in some states, yet its courts have a
comparatively strong record of inferring culpability requirements; the
same is probably true of New York.
B. Other Legislative Approval of Strict Liability
Legislatures endorse strict liability not only by enacting weaker
alternatives to the MPC culpability canons or by acquiescing to state
court strict-liability interpretations. They also do so by enacting
specific strict-liability rules. Kansas, Minnesota, New York, and
Wisconsin each have a general statute dictating that “[c]riminal intent
does not require proof of knowledge of the age of a minor even
133
though age is a material element in the crime in question.” New
132. On the other hand, Colorado’s weak version of a presumption to imply missing mens
rea terms plausibly helps explain the decision in Gorman. In that case, the court inferred a
knowledge requirement for one element but not another. See supra notes 78, 84. A stronger
presumption could have led to a holding that knowledge was required for both—although case
law in other states, such as Ohio, shows that adoption of a stronger presumption does not
necessarily stop courts from readily inferring strict liability in comparable settings.
133. MINN. STAT. § 609.02(9) (2009); WIS. STAT. § 939.23(6) (2005); see also KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 21-5204(b) (Supp. 2011) (“Proof of a culpable mental state does not require
proof . . . that the accused had knowledge of the age of a minor, even though age is a material
element of the crime with which the accused is charged.”); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.20(3)
(McKinney 2009) (“[K]nowledge by the defendant of the age of [a] child is not an element of
any . . . offense and it is not, unless expressly so provided, a defense . . . that the defendant did
not know the age of the child . . . .”). The Kansas statute survived the state’s MPC-based code
revision in 2011. See JOHN W. WHITE & BRETT WATSON, KAN. CRIMINAL CODE
RECODIFICATION COMM’N, 2010 FINAL REPORT TO THE KANSAS LEGISLATURE 21–23 (2010),
available
at
http://www.kansasjudicialcouncil.org/Documents/Studies%20and%20Reports/
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York has a similar statute stating that proof of a defendant’s
134
knowledge regarding the weight of illegal drugs is never required.
And legislatures sometimes make strict liability truly explicit in
particular offense definitions; the New Jersey statute noted above,
specifying strict liability on the school-zone element of drug offenses,
135
is one example. The New Jersey legislature, in fact, adds express
strict-liability components to many offense definitions—some of
136
which trigger substantial punishment increases, including a notable
137
(or notorious) strict-liability homicide offense. And it has done so
even though it also enacted strong culpability presumptions that track
138
closely the original MPC language. Pennsylvania, a state that

2010%20Reports/Recodification%20Final%20Report.pdf (citing the MPC in a discussion of
changes to culpability provisions of the Kansas Code). For a survey of states with similar rules
regarding age elements in statutory rape offenses, see Carpenter, supra note 23, at 385–91. The
MPC has a comparable, but much more limited, general rule on the invalidity a minor’s consent.
See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.11(3) (Official Draft 1985) (“[A]ssent does not constitute consent
if . . . it is given by a person who by reason of youth . . . is manifestly unable or known by the
actor to be unable to make a reasonable judgment as to the nature or harmlessness of the
conduct . . . .”). For an example of an MPC offense to which the rule dictating strict liability for
age elements would apply, see id. § 213.1(1), which defines rape.
134. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.20(4) (McKinney 2009).
135. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:35-7 (West 2005 & Supp. 2012); see also supra note 37 and
accompanying text.
136. New Jersey offenses with strict-liability elements include: N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2C:11-4(a)(2) (West 2005) (providing for strict liability as to manslaughter caused “while
fleeing or attempting to elude a law enforcement officer”); id. § 2C:11-5.1 (stating that
knowledge of death is not an element of the crime of leaving the scene of a motor vehicle
accident causing death); id. § 2C:12-1(b)(6), (b)(8), (f) (requiring no mens rea for certain
circumstances constituting aggravated assault); id. § 2C:12-3(a) (specifying that, with respect to
the offense of making terroristic threats during an emergency, the existence of emergency is a
strict-liability element); id. § 2C:20-25(h) (requiring no knowledge or intent with respect to
whether an entity is a public agency for computer-related theft from a public agency); id.
§ 2C:21-22 (mandating that “caus[ing] injury to another” is a strict-liability element of the
offense of unauthorized practice of law); id. § 2C:24-4(6) (providing for strict liability as to the
child’s age for the offense of endangering the welfare of children by engaging in sexual acts); id.
§ 2C:33-3(d) (stating that strict liability applies to the emergency component of triggering false
public alarms during an emergency); id. § 2C:35-6 (mandating strict liability as to the minor’s
age for the offense of involving a minor in drug activity); id. § 2C:38-5(b)(2) (providing support
to terrorist groups is a strict-liability offense as to the group’s status as a terrorist organization).
137. See id. § 2C:35-9 (mandating homicide liability for drug sellers if their buyers die from
voluntarily ingesting the drugs); see also State v. Rodriguez, 645 A.2d 1165, 1176 (N.J. 1994)
(affirming a conviction under the statute after victims voluntarily ingested the drugs). For a
similar statute and affirmation of a conviction, see MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.317a (2004); and
People v. Liddell, No. 2007-214278-FC, 2009 WL 529840, at *2 (Mich. Ct. App. Mar. 3, 2009).
For a harsh criticism of such statutes, see HUSAK, supra note 6, at 45–54, 74–75.
138. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-2(c) (West 2005). Strong general presumptions are not
inconsistent, of course, with clearly specified exceptions.
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adopted the MPC culpability rules nearly verbatim, added strictliability elements, including in the school-zone element of its drug
offense, in a different way—by shifting some result and circumstance
elements into its sentencing guidelines, where they are treated as
139
strict-liability sentencing factors rather than offense elements. With
respect to the clarity of legislative intent, at least, these two states are
salutary models. Courts start with clear instructions not to infer strict
liability unless such legislative intent is plain, and the legislatures
provide plenty of examples of very explicit strict-liability elements.
That combination should keep courts from too readily inferring,
through non-MPC interpretive canons, strict liability in offenses
without explicit language.
140
If courts nonetheless infer strict liability too easily, it may be
because courts take a signal from the legislature’s repeated use of
strict liability. Perhaps courts infer that strict-liability provisions
adopted after the enactment of culpability presumptions indicate
greater legislative acceptance of strict liability over time and a weaker
commitment to ensuring that punishment is allocated proportionately
to culpability. And rather than adhering to a judicial role that
enforces the legislature’s prior commitments to general presumptions
save for clearly specified exceptions, courts shift to a role in which
they infer and facilitate a diminished legislative acceptance for the
correspondence principle throughout a broad range of statutes.
III. THE ALTERNATIVE TO PROPORTIONATE LIABILITY:
STRICT LIABILITY WITHIN THE SCOPE OF CULPABLE CONDUCT
A. The Implicit Parameters of Strict Criminal Liability
The foregoing presents a picture of much wider adoption of strict
liability in MPC states than one would expect from the MPC itself.
The prevalence of strict liability is a result of choices by both
legislatures and courts. Many legislatures signaled their disagreement
with the MPC from the beginning by enacting revisions that weaken
the critical presumption of mental-state terms attached to every
element. Those that did not adopt such revisions often imposed strict
liability in other ways.

139. For a discussion of Pennsylvania law, see supra note 87.
140. See supra notes 58, 130.
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Working from their legislatures’ MPC-inspired reforms—and
often going farther than those statutory provisions require—many
state courts have shown a notable and consistent willingness to infer
legislative preference for strict liability. As a matter of judicial
practice, the MPC provisions have not changed courts’ statutoryinterpretation methods as much as its supporters undoubtedly hoped.
The exception for strict liability when intent for it “plainly appears”
has proven to be a more frequently invoked rationale on which to
infer strict liability than the MPC drafters intended. Even when
applying the strong culpability presumptions found in many state
codes, courts regularly invoke strict liability through other
interpretive conventions—textual meaning, sentence and codesection structure, implicit statutory purposes, predicted effects, and
the force of prior judicial decisions. Courts have generally declined to
use the MPC canons as a reason to demand that legislatures express
strict liability in the incontrovertibly clear terms that the New Jersey
legislature frequently does. Instead, judges assume the role of quasi
partners of legislators and search for subtle indications of intended
strict liability in statutory language, even when that intent is far from
plain.
The evidence allows this conclusion: even after the enactment of
express culpability presumptions, courts and legislatures in those
states mostly remain uncommitted to the correspondence principle as
a core premise of criminal law. State adoption of MPC-based code
reforms should not be taken as a signal that states thereby committed
their criminal-justice systems to the premise that punishment is
justified only in proportion to liability. Instead, courts in many states
continue to give mens rea and proof of fault a more restricted role:
proof of culpability as to some initial offense or core conduct
element—some threshold that separates innocent actors from guilty
ones—is morally sufficient. Contemporary criminal law is
141
characterized neither by Coke’s unlawful act theory, nor by the
MPC’s position, the correspondence principle. The premise of
contemporary criminal law is somewhere in between.
The prevailing principle, which courts do little to elaborate, is
suggested by the rationale that judges regularly invoke for strictliability interpretations. The principle is the idea that no proof of
culpability is required beyond that needed to ensure that an actor is

141. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
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142

not convicted for purely innocent conduct. This view describes
much of what legislatures and courts widely take as the normatively
acceptable, and preferable, relationship of punishment to culpability.
The purpose of culpability is primarily, and often exclusively, to
distinguish innocent actors from guilty ones.
State and federal courts frequently cite the U.S. Supreme Court
143
for this point. Relying on United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc.,
courts emphasize “the presumption in favor of a scienter requirement
should apply to each of the statutory elements [of an offense] that
144
criminalize otherwise innocent conduct” —but no elements beyond
those. Once proof of culpability reveals that a defendant is not an
innocent actor, the essential work of mental-state requirements is
done. Mens rea need not attach to other elements that serve only to
enhance liability, from a lesser to a greater offense level, or that only
serve to trigger greater punishment. Elements that merely distinguish
greater from lesser offenses, or greater from lesser sentences, need no
justification from proof of culpability to do that work. Those
distinctions can be justified on grounds unrelated to moral fault.
Relying on the common judicial formulation, this may be called the
“otherwise innocent” principle. Alternately, it can be understood as a
principle of “threshold culpability”: once an actor crosses the
threshold from innocent to culpable, requirements for mens rea proof
145
diminish.
146
The Illinois Court of Appeals in People v. Brooks provided a
typical statement: “Once the legislature has determined that certain
conduct is criminal, it need not require the State to prove a
142. See, e.g., In re C.R.M., 611 N.W.2d 802 (Minn. 2000) (“[G]reat care is taken to avoid
interpreting statutes as eliminating mens rea where doing so criminalizes a broad range of what
would otherwise be innocent conduct.”); State v. Lester, 916 N.E.2d 1038, 1042 (Ohio 2009)
(“When the additional fact makes innocent conduct criminal, . . . it is unlikely that the General
Assembly ‘plainly intended’ to impose strict liability.”).
143. United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64 (1994).
144. Id. at 72 (emphasis added). Similarly, Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419 (1985),
noted the particular care that the Supreme Court has taken to avoid construing a statute to
dispense with mens rea where doing so would “criminalize a broad range of apparently innocent
conduct,” id. at 426. For typical state court reliance on Supreme Court jurisprudence in MPC
states, see Saxton v. Commonwealth, 315 S.W.3d 293 (Ky. 2010), which explains the role of the
Liparota holding on state drug laws, Saxton, 315 S.W.3d at 296, and Massey v. State, 933 S.W.2d
582, 584 (Tex. Ct. App. 1996), which held that there is no culpability requirement for the age of
minor victim in the sexual assault offense, TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.011 (West 1994).
145. Darryl K. Brown, Federal Mens Rea Interpretation and the Limits of Culpability’s
Relevance, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 109, 111 (2012).
146. People v. Brooks, 648 N.E.2d 626 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995).
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defendant’s knowledge of a particular victim’s infirmity before the
criminal may suffer additional punishment because of that
147
infirmity.” This view sharply conflicts with the Illinois code’s
culpability presumptions, according to which “the prescribed mental
state applies to each such element,” and “[i]f the statute does not
prescribe a mental state applicable to an element,” recklessness “is
148
applicable.” The Ohio Supreme Court made the same point:
“[C]ommitting a theft offense is not innocent conduct. Consequently,
it is reasonable that the General Assembly would impose strict
liability on the additional circumstance of [possessing a
weapon], . . . [an] activity that enhances the seriousness of the
149
criminal activity” In Ward, an Ohio appellate court explained the
strict-liability interpretation of the school-proximity drug offense by
150
noting that it “does not criminalize otherwise innocent behavior.”
The Oregon Supreme Court invoked the same idea for the same
holding, noting that drug offenders, near a school or not, are
151
“engaging in their illegal activity.”
The principle, more fully described, seems to be this: criminal
liability must always require proof of culpability regarding whatever
core elements of an offense define its wrongful nature. For theft, one
must culpably take property, recognizing that it is property of another.
Similarly for drug offenses, one must culpably distribute, aware of a
drug’s identity. Culpability thereby functions to ensure that actors
know they are engaged in criminal rather than lawful conduct, or that
they are reckless in that regard.
The critical normative point is that this proof shifts an actor’s
status from innocent to one justifiably eligible for punishment.
Thereafter, strict liability is acceptable for further offense elements

147. Id. at 629 (explaining that mental-state requirements do not extend to “[e]nhancing
provisions” because they only “concern consequences of the offense which make [the offense]
more serious”).
148. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/4-3(b) (West 2002) (emphasis added); see also id. § 5/4-9
(explaining that strict liability is limited to “clearly indicated” exceptions).
149. State v. Lester, 916 N.E.2d 1038, 1042–43 (Ohio 2009); see also State v. Smith, 963 A.2d
281, 289 (N.J. 2009) (providing similar reasoning for a strict-liability interpretation of the
unlawful-firearm-possession offense, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:39-3 (West 2005)); State v.
Maldonado, 645 A.2d 1165, 1176 (N.J. 1994) (conceding that “differential treatment based on
result and regardless of state of mind” occurs under “any strict liability statute”).
150. State v. Ward, 637 N.E.2d 16, 18–19 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993).
151. State v. Rutley, 171 P.3d 361, 365 (Or. 2007).
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that define a more serious offense or that increase punishment. On
this view, culpability plays no role in those grade and sentence
distinctions. Courts commonly presume this view to be the
legislature’s consistent principle that their interpretive choices should
153
effectuate.
B. A Culpability-Based Rationale for Strict-Liability Elements
Despite the widely invoked otherwise-innocent principle and its
stated disregard for allowing culpability to play any role in
distinguishing offense and punishment levels, the case law reveals
implicit limits, which courts breach only occasionally, on the types of
offense elements to which strict liability can attach. Those breaches, I
will argue, indicate that a case is wrongly decided. Largely, the
offense elements to which strict liability attaches are consequences
and circumstances that can be said to be within the scope of the risk of
154
the unlawful activity for which culpability is required.
152. See Brooks, 648 N.E.2d at 629–30 (“Here the State was required to prove that
defendant knew he was delivering cocaine. That conduct constituted a felony. The enhancing
factor the State did not have to prove was that the defendant was aware of the proximity to
public housing sites. That factor merely enhanced the offense to a more serious felony.”); State
v. Harris, 623 N.E.2d 1240, 1244 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993) (explaining that the strict-liability
element “merely enhances the sentence of the underlying drug trafficking offense” and that
“[t]he mens rea requirement is met by the knowing sale or offer to sell a controlled substance,”
which “assures that the ‘schoolyard’ provision does not ‘criminalize a broad range of apparently
innocent conduct’”).
Punishment increases can be substantial. In Denby, the strict-liability school-zone
element added a mandatory three consecutive years to a five-year sentence for the base drug
offense. State v. Denby, 668 A.2d 682, 685 (Conn. 1995); see also CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 21a-278a(b) (West 2006) (mandating that offenders “shall be imprisoned for a term of three
years, which shall not be suspended and shall be in addition and consecutive to any term of
imprisonment imposed for violation of section 21a-277 [authorizing up to fifteen years in prison
for distributing hallucinogens or narcotics and up to seven years for other controlled drugs] or
21a-278 [setting a mandatory minimum sentence of five years—and a maximum of life in
prison—for distributing more than half an ounce of cocaine and certain other drugs]”); id. § 21a278a(a) (mandating a minimum sentence of two consecutive years in prison for distribution of
controlled substances to a person under the age of eighteen).
153. See, e.g., State v. Blanton, 588 P.2d 28, 29 (Or. 1978) (en banc) (noting that “[a] policy
against criminal liability without fault need not go so far as to protect a culpable defendant from
an unanticipated extent of liability” but then concluding that the legislature had rejected this
policy and had chosen “to require a culpable mental state with respect to each element in the
definition of an offense”).
154. For an excellent theoretical development of basically this idea, see Kenneth W. Simons,
Is Strict Criminal Liability in the Grading of Offences Consistent with Retributive Desert, 32
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 445, 446 (2012), which argues that strict liability can be justified with
regard to culpability, inter alia, when the risk as to the strict-liability element is intrinsic to the
lesser crime and minimally foreseeable. This is the critical distinction from Coke’s account that
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If courts rarely describe the limits of their strict-liability
inferences in these terms, that may be in part because the statutes, in
an implicit sense, do so. Legislatures may leave unclear the extent of
culpability requirements, but they do define the elements of offenses,
and the result and circumstance elements to which strict liability
attaches mostly have a plausible connection to the nature of the
culpable conduct and the risks that such conduct might create. None
of the judicial inferences of strict liability look quite as dramatically
disproportionate as Coke’s approval of murder liability for one who
155
intended only unlawful chicken killing.
Consider the kinds of elements to which courts attach strict
liability. Elements regarding the age of participants in drug
transactions or of victims in sex-related and other assault offenses
156
commonly lack a mental-state requirement. But an actor can
foresee that the other person might be under age eighteen (even if the
actor in fact does not). And one is more likely to do so with activities
that require interaction with the other person. Seeing another person
provides at least a little information about age, and even though some
teens appear a few years older than their age, the claim is not that
only negligent actors make these mistakes. This is also true regarding
a victim’s status as an “at risk” or mentally disabled person incapable
of consenting to sex. Similarly, one who takes or damages property
can be aware of the possibility that the property may be worth much
more than one intends or foresees; the same is true for the weight or
quantity of contraband one possesses.
This account is related to the established rationale for strict
liability in felony regulatory offenses, such as those governing
murder liability can rest on an actor’s unlawful attempt to shoot fowl. See supra note 11. On the
contemporary view, Coke’s shooter might be strictly liable for shooting a protected species,
hunting out of season, or hunting without a license. But liability for an entirely different risk and
harm—murder—would not rest on strict liability today, particularly not in circumstances in
which no one in the position of Coke’s shooter would foresee injury to a person.
155. But for an argument that certain contemporary statutes in fact are grossly
disproportionate, see HUSAK, supra note 6, at 45–54, 74–75, which criticizes a New Jersey drug
offense, see supra note 137, for imposing strict homicide liability.
156. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:24-4(6), 2C:35-6 (West 2005) (mandating strict liability
as to the minor’s age for the offense of endangering the welfare of children by engaging in
sexual acts and for the offense of involving minors in drug activities); People v. Brooks, 648
N.E.2d 626, 630 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (“A number of decisions of State courts, consistent with our
decision here, uphold statutory provisions enhancing penalties for illegal drug activities which
take place within a prescribed distance of schools even though the perpetrators are unaware of
the existence of the schools.”); Carpenter, supra note 23, at 385–91 (surveying and classifying
statutory rape statutes).

BROWN IN PRINTER PROOF FINAL REVISED (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

PERSISTENCE OF STRICT LIABILITY

10/29/2012 10:02 AM

329

firearms. Under that doctrine, knowledge that one is engaged in
highly regulated conduct, such as possession of certain weapons, but
157
not ordinary rifles, displaces a need for culpability as to elements
that make the conduct criminal, such as the weapon’s unregistered
158
status or absence of serial numbers. In both settings, actors might be
reasonable in not recognizing that the strict-liability element exists.
Yet the element (nonregistration) bears a plausible relation to the
knowing conduct (possession); it is within the scope of risks one can
foresee from that conduct.
This description suggests an intelligible, if ultimately
unpersuasive, normative justification for many strict-liability
159
decisions. Strict-liability elements are facts as to which actors,
engaged in culpable conduct, oftentimes are negligent, and in some
cases reckless. Although this is not true in every case—one who is
engaged in sexual activity, for example, may have good reasons to
think a particular partner is over a specified age—the generalization
about negligence is plausible for most scenarios implicated by these
sorts of strict-liability elements. If that is so, then strict-liability
elements have more connection to culpability than they initially seem
to. On this generalization, strict liability does not reject culpability’s
relevance but merely serves it imperfectly; strict liability is a clear rule
with the inevitable weaknesses of clear rules—it is overinclusive for
160
some cases and thus generates some “false positives.” The critical
supposition here is that, in many offenses, proof of offense elements,
even without proof of culpability for the strict-liability element,
nonetheless frequently allows an inference of minimal culpability—

157. Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 607 (1994).
158. Id. at 619; People v. Stanley, 921 N.E.2d 445, 452–54 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009); State v.
Jordan, 733 N.E.2d 601, 606–07 (Ohio 2000).
159. For a more extensive and subtle development of a closely related argument, see
Simons, supra note 154.
160. Professor Frederick Schauer wrote the definitive work on the nature, and virtue, of
rules in this respect, developing the insight that rules that are clear and easy to administer but
generate an imperfect record of outcomes across cases can be preferable to more costly,
discretionary, individualized decision making. See generally FREDERICK F. SCHAUER, PLAYING
BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN
LAW AND IN LIFE (1993); Frederick F. Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509 (1988) (“At the
heart of the word ‘formalism,’ in many of its numerous uses, lies the concept of decisionmaking
according to rule. Formalism is the way in which rules achieve their ‘ruleness’: precisely by
doing what is supposed to be the failing of formalism: screening off from a decisionmaker
factors that a sensitive decisionmaker would otherwise take into account.”).
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recklessness, or perhaps only negligence —for the strict-liability
element. When that is true given the nature of a particular crime, the
normative rationale for strict liability improves. Strict liability, in the
context of such offenses, does not signal a rejection of culpability’s
justifying role; instead it represents a trade-off of the costs for proof
of culpability that is inferable in most such cases even without that
proof requirement.
IV. WHY COURTS CIRCUMVENT CULPABILITY PRESUMPTIONS
A. Culpability’s Limited Significance
The account just presented provides much of the most plausible
explanation for why state courts in the last three to four decades have
so frequently circumvented rather than given effect to the culpability
presumptions that their legislatures adopted in the era of MPCinspired criminal-law reform. Key reasons are explicit in the recurrent
themes of judicial reasoning on mens rea questions. Courts simply are
not persuaded by the normative premise that the MPC offered to
state reformers and that the strongest codifications of its model would
seem to instantiate: liability should generally and presumptively
accord with individual culpability, and distinctions in offense gravity
and punishment severity should rest on proof of an actor’s fault as
well as proof of facts. Instead, courts widely endorse a more limited
conception of culpability’s function, the otherwise-innocent principle
162
or a principle of threshold culpability. Under that principle,
culpability’s only task is to separate innocent from guilty actors. Once
an actor has placed himself in the latter group, liability and
punishment can be adjusted without regard to fault. Courts are
explicit on that much. Implicitly and with little direct
acknowledgement, the body of strict-liability decisions suggests an
additional rationale: strict-liability elements that adjust sanctions for
those who cross the threshold of basic culpability are often of a nature
that suggests an actor’s culpability even as to those elements.
It bears emphasis that the scope-of-the-risk rationale is at best
implicit, because courts’ failure to engage that rationale as a limit on
strict liability probably accounts for the rationale’s failure to guide
courts in all strict-liability decisions. Courts’ explicit reasons for strict
161. I hold aside here the debate of whether negligence is minimally sufficient for criminal
liability.
162. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.

BROWN IN PRINTER PROOF FINAL REVISED (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

PERSISTENCE OF STRICT LIABILITY

10/29/2012 10:02 AM

331

liability, by contrast, are predominantly instrumental. In the vast
majority of decisions discussed in this Article, courts justify strictliability punishments—beyond the threshold-culpability rationale—by
reference to the deterrence and harm-prevention functions of the
offense. After proof shifts an actor’s status from innocent to criminal,
judicial attention shifts to victim and public interests in safety, with no
recognition of any defendant or public interest in punishment graded
by culpability. If a statute’s purpose is to protect minors, any further
culpability requirement is counterproductive to a policy of achieving
additional protection by additional punishment. Proof requirements
(of any sort) always make the state’s case harder to win and thus
163
punishment harder to impose. An Illinois court offered a typical
observation on this point: “Requiring proof of defendant’s knowledge
of the victim’s age would nullify much of the protection the
legislature intended because a person’s age may not be readily
164
ascertainable.” In the offense of endangering a child’s welfare, a
New Jersey court refused “to require proof that a defendant knew his
conduct would impair or debauch the child’s morals, as such a
construction would weaken the very protection of children that the
165
Legislature has for decades striven to achieve.” Similarly for drug
offenses near a school: “[T]he legislature intended to protect children
from drug use . . . . [R]equiring a knowing mental state with regard to
the distance element would work against the obvious legislative
166
purpose . . . .” The category of reasons for justifying liability and
punishment simply shifts to entirely different grounds. For actors at
fault of a basic offense, culpability no longer enters the discussion for
why a mens rea requirement might be required. Judicial focus
becomes overwhelmingly utilitarian.
B. Judicial Roles and Political Consensus
Taking the search for explanations one step further, consider
why courts so consistently limit themselves to instrumentalist

163. Cf., e.g., Gorman v. People, 19 P.3d 662, 668 (Colo. 2000) (explaining that the
prosecution bears the burden of proving “all elements of the offense,” which in that case meant
that the state must prove that “the person whom the defendant knowingly induced . . . to violate
a law . . . was a minor at the time of the offense,” but not “that the defendant knew the person
was a minor”).
164. People v. Gramo, 623 N.E.2d 926, 934 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993).
165. State v. Bryant, 15 A.3d 865, 872 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2011) (discussing an
eighteen-year-old convicted of having sex with a fourteen-year-old).
166. State v. Rutley, 171 P.3d 361, 365 (Or. 2007).
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rationales as tools for interpreting mens rea requirements. Why
doesn’t culpability’s role in apportioning punishment—inherent in the
presumptions by which these courts are bound—resonate more often
as a counterweight argument, even if not the predominate one? A
likely reason is the one sketched in the Introduction: at the same time
that the MPC was prompting legislatures to reform their criminal
codes and adopt (in many cases) strong presumptions for mens rea
requirements, legislatures were also reforming criminal law in an
entirely different direction. Beginning roughly in the early 1970s,
federal and state governments expanded their catalogues of criminal
offenses, sharply increased sentences, reduced parole possibilities and
judicial discretion in sentencing, and generally expanded the capacity
167
of criminal-justice system, especially the prison system. American
incarceration rates for the several decades through the 1960s roughly
tracked European rates, imprisoning about one hundred to 150
168
residents per 100,000. Between the 1970s and the 2000s, those rates
have approximately quintupled to more than 600 per 100,000—rates
unprecedented in American history and in other advanced nations,
169
and in virtually all nations of any developmental or political status.
This put state courts—at least courts in states that adopted
strong MPC culpability rules—in a bind. Those new code provisions
called for a substantial change in courts’ analytical methods and tools
for interpreting criminal statutes, and they also suggested a
substantive shift away from common-law traditions of inferring strictliability elements in many offense elements. That revision is hard
enough to implement. But at the same time, everything else in
legislative decision making about criminal law seemed to point in the
other direction, the direction of increasing punishment and efficiently

167. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
168. See, e.g., JUSTICE POL’Y INST., THE PUNISHING DECADE: PRISON AND JAIL
ESTIMATES AT THE MILLENNIUM 1 (2000) (charting the rapid rise in U.S. incarceration rates
beginning in the 1970S); see also infra note 169.
169. See, e.g., PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, supra note 6, at 1 (“[A] stunning 1 in every 31
adults [in the United States], or 3.2 percent, is under some form of correctional control.”); PEW
CTR. ON THE STATES, PRISON COUNT 2010, at 2 (2010), available at http://www.pewtrusts.org/
uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/sentencing_and_corrections/Prison_Count_2010.pdf
(noting that U.S. prison populations grew 705 percent from 1970 to 2010); ROY WALMSLEY,
WORLD PRISON POPULATION LIST 1 (11th ed. 2011), available at http://www.idcr.org.uk/wpcontent/uploads/2010/09/WPPL-9-22.pdf (comparing incarceration rates for 218 countries and
noting that “[t]he United States has the highest prison population rate in the world, 743 per
100,000,” while “more than half the countries and territories (54%) have rates below 150 per
100,000”).
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facilitating convictions. The last four decades have been an unlikely
period during which to expect courts to increase mens rea
requirements over their pre-MPC traditions, or to hold legislatures to
their own, codified commitments to expanded culpability
requirements.
Strict and dedicated adherence to MPC-based culpability
presumptions, in short, called on courts to take a counter-political
role. To infer mens rea requirements is to make crimes harder to
prove. At the appellate decision-making level, it means reversing
convictions. As a feature of separation of powers, it means requiring
legislatures to be very clear in creating exceptions to their own rule
that culpability is presumed for every offense element, which means
offenses remain harder for prosecutors to prove—after courts read
them to contain mens rea requirements—at least until legislatures get
around to amending the statute. Most state court judges hold office
by virtue of some sort of electoral process; others do so by political
appointment, but apparently none, save in Rhode Island, hold life
170
tenure like federal judges. Taking up the task of enforcing mens rea
presumptions that seem to counter every other executive- and
legislative-branch signal about the criminal law policy preferences
was a lot—it turns out, too much—to ask.
V. THE COSTS OF INSTRUMENTAL REASONING AND
UNACKNOWLEDGED RATIONALES
If there was ever a struggle between the MPC’s principle of
proportionate liability and the older, more limited understanding of
the “guilty mind” that must accompany a wrongful act, the
proportionality idea lost. Overwhelmingly, the express rationales that
govern mens rea interpretation even in MPC states are the ideas of
threshold culpability and instrumental harm prevention—companion
ideas that a guilty individual is eligible for any degree of punishment
necessary to achieve the ends of public safety, without regard to his
culpability for the offense elements that guide upward, instrumental
adjustments in sanctions.

170. Sanford C. Gordon & Gregory A. Huber, The Effect of Electoral Competitiveness on
Incumbent Behavior, 2 Q.J. POL. SCI. 107, 110 (2007) (stating that judges in thirty-nine states
face periodic election); Linda Greenhouse, New Focus on the Effects of Life Tenure, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 10, 2007, at A20 (“Most countries place term or age limits on their high-court
judges, as do 49 states (all but Rhode Island).”).
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In the main, I have suggested, the pattern of strict-liability
decisions fits a rationale that courts do not acknowledge: strictliability elements tend to be those within the scope of the risks of the
culpable conduct, which commonly raises an inference of culpability
even as to those elements for which proof of mens rea is not required.
But there is a cost to an implicit premise that courts rarely
acknowledge. The cost in this setting is that courts are less likely to
apply an unarticulated limit on strict liability consistently, and they
are more likely to focus on instrumental functions of punishment and
to reach decisions that breach the implicit scope-of-risk premise.
Several examples of strict-liability decisions can be understood to
violate this parameter. Three examples make the point.
Offenses that punish assault or homicide more severely when the
victim was a law enforcement official provide an example. In many
such cases, the officer-victim was working undercover, posing as a
fellow criminal; the strategy is to prevent the offender from having
171
any suspicion of the officer’s true status. It is easy to understand the
view that knowingly assaulting an officer is a more culpable crime
than assaulting a civilian, but it is harder to see how assaulting a
fellow criminal is less culpable than assaulting one whom an actor
reasonably believed to be a fellow criminal but who turned out to be
an undercover officer. Yet some state courts (including MPC states)
impose strict liability as to a victim’s official identity, even when that
172
fact elevates noncapital murder to capital murder.

171. See, e.g., United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 674 (1975) (“[T]he evidence shows that
[Defendant] and his confederates arranged for a sale of heroin to buyers who turned out to be
undercover agents for the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs.”).
172. Compare Ex parte Murry, 455 So. 2d 72, 76 (Ala. 1984), (holding that knowledge of an
officer’s identity is required in capital murder), superseded by Undercover Officers Protection
Act of 1987, No. 87-709, 1987 Ala. Laws 1252 (codified as amended at ALA. CODE § 13A-5-40
(LexisNexis 2005)), with State v. Brown, 998 P.2d 321, 327 (Wash. 2000) (“[T]he State is not
required to charge and prove that a defendant at the time of the assault knew the victim was a
law enforcement officer engaged in the performance of official duties.”). The difference is
apparent in statutes as well; some contain explicit knowledge or negligence requirements.
Compare COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1201 (5)(c)(I) (2012) (requiring that the “defendant knew
or should have known” that the victim was an officer); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04(A)(6)
(West 2006) (same); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.03(a)(1) (West 2011) (same); and UTAH
CODE ANN. § 76-5-202(1)(m) (LexisNexis 2008 & Supp. 2012) (same), with MO. ANN. STAT. §
565.032(2)(8) (West 2012) (including no knowledge requirement), and 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 9711(d)(1) (West 2007) (same). State courts often cite the U.S. Supreme Court’s conclusion
for the same federal offense that the purpose of police-protection statutes “could well be
frustrated by the imposition of a strict scienter requirement.” Feola, 420 U.S. at 678.

BROWN IN PRINTER PROOF FINAL REVISED (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

PERSISTENCE OF STRICT LIABILITY

10/29/2012 10:02 AM

335

Another example is homicide liability for drug sellers when a
173
buyer subsequently dies from voluntarily ingesting the drugs. One
criticism stresses the attenuated causation in such cases: the drug
buyer’s voluntary choice to ingest drugs would normally be
characterized as the primary and proximate cause of death, and
thereby also as an intervening cause that bars the seller’s liability for
174
the death. A second criticism assesses the drug seller’s negligence or
lack thereof. One view could be that every reasonable person knows
that providing illicit drugs to another creates an undue risk of the
buyer’s death. It is more plausible to conclude that sellers know from
experience that most drug users consume drugs without immediate
fatal consequences (otherwise the customer base quickly vanishes);
sellers therefore reasonably assess any buyer’s risk of death from a
single drug sale as minimal. On that view, the death is outside the
scope of the risk that made the seller’s drug-distribution conduct
dangerous, and no inference of even a negligent mental state is
justified.
Finally, consider the school-zone drug offenses. It is debatable
whether negligence (hold aside recklessness) as to school proximity
can be reliably assumed in enough cases to justify strict liability. On
the one hand, one might assume that all urban residents know that it
is always possible a school can be nearby even when not in view. On
the other hand, city schools often are not only several streets away
but are also separated by visual and pedestrian barriers like train
tracks or interstate highways; even reasonable people, familiar with
neighborhoods, may not foresee that a school property comes within
175
one thousand feet. Courts occasionally concede this. On this latter
173. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.317a (2004) (imposing homicide liability for drug sellers
whose buyers die from ingesting drugs); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:35-9 (West 2005) (same).
Notably, these strict-liability offenses are explicitly imposed by legislatures rather than inferred
by courts.
174. For a much more extensive criticism of this offense as “an example of
overcriminalization,” see HUSAK, supra note 6, at 45–54.
175. See, e.g., United States v. Falu, 776 F.2d 46, 49–50 (2d Cir. 1985) (conceding that one
might reasonably not know one’s distance from a school in “urban areas where schools are not
clearly visible from points within the 1,000-foot zone or are not readily identifiable”). A survey
of large-city school locations on Google Maps suggests that one can be less than one thousand
feet from a school and yet separated by interstate highways, railway lines, rivers, or other
pedestrian and sight barriers. A random example from Google Maps is the Philadelphia School
in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. 2501 Lombard Street, Philadelphia, PA 19146, GOOGLE MAPS,
http://maps.google.com (search “2501 Lombard Street, Philadelphia, PA 19146”).
Skepticism about the normative legitimacy of aggravating punishment upon this fact
alone increases if one views the school-distance element as an excessive prophylactic against the
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view, at least, inferring an offender’s negligence as to school
proximity is not justified. If recklessness is the minimal culpable
176
mental state (as most state interpretive presumptions dictate), an
inference of culpability is even weaker.
Many examples of courts’ strict-liability interpretations, I have
argued, rest on the premise that culpability can be assumed for
certain classes of offenses in which the offender is usually negligent or
reckless as to the strict-liability element, and therefore absence of a
proof requirement is not as grave a breach of the correspondence
principle as it seems. But for offenses such as these three examples,
that assumption is less plausible. A finding of negligence and
recklessness requires not merely factual determinations (for example,
do reasonable people foresee this risk) but evaluative ones (for
example, is the risk substantial and disregard of it unjustifiable).
Reaching the evaluative conclusion about a category of offenders
seems more justified for some offenses, such as those defined by the
age of minors with whom an offender closely interacted, than in
others, such as these three examples (undercover agents, drug deaths,
and perhaps school zones). In the sorts of cases that these latter
examples represent, strict liability cannot easily (or at all) be justified
by the implicit scope-of-the-risk rationale. Most courts seem to
recognize this, judging by how widely they rely on instrumental
177
explanations unrelated to culpability in many decisions. But they

underlying interest it serves, in keeping school children from exposure to drug dealers and
transactions. (Typically, it does not matter whether school is in session or whether children are
in sight of the offense.) For a typical legislative statement of this purpose, see TENN. CODE
ANN. § 39-17-432(a) (2010).
176. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 251(b) (2007); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 702-204
(LexisNexis 2007); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/4-3(b) (West 2002); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 215202(e) (Supp. 2011); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-11-301(c) (2010); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §
6.02(c) (West 2011); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-102 (LexisNexis 2008).
177. Perhaps what makes so many amenable to strict liability in this offense is not simply the
assumptions about the probability of the circumstance (school proximity) but also the gravity of
that circumstance and the amount of liability and punishment dependent upon it. Even if the
odds of having a nearby school are long in some settings such that overlooking it is reasonable,
close proximity to a school is in some sense within the nature of an urban drug sale. Put
differently, the punishment triggered by its occurrence is not grossly out of proportion to what
offenders might expect for the basic offense. In comparison, a homicide triggering murder
liability from culpably shooting at fowl is much more distinct from the nature of the culpable
act, and the sanction is much greater, even if in some scenarios the odds of human injury are not
wildly long. Vice President Dick Cheney learned something about those odds. See Anne E.
Kornblut, Cheney Shoots Fellow Hunter in Mishap on a Texas Ranch, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2006,
at A1 (“Vice President Dick Cheney accidentally shot and wounded a prominent Austin, Tex.,
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also are not to be bothered by it, which may represent either the
triumph of the threshold culpability principle over the proportionate
liability principle or a failure by courts to recognize the limits of the
scope-of-the-risk rationale, because it is only an implicit commitment
which courts can easily overlook.
CONCLUSION
From this survey of case law and statutes in MPC states, it is hard
to doubt the failure of the MPC’s culpability principle under which
subjective fault is essential to the proportionate assignment of liability
and punishment. With some encouragement from legislatures that
departed from the MPC in significant respects, courts in MPC states
have widely interpreted their criminal statutes in accord with a more
limited culpability principle, one which embraces strict-liability
elements and rejects the MPC’s strong commitment to proportionate
punishment for actors found to be blameworthy for some aspect of an
offense. Perhaps this is not surprising, given that this view long
178
characterized pre-MPC criminal law. Strict liability remains deeply
179
engrained and accepted in American criminal law, and probably in
180
public opinion. It shares something in common with the larger and
lawyer on Saturday while the two men were quail hunting in South Texas, firing a shotgun at the
man while trying to aim for a bird . . . .”).
178. See generally, e.g., Jeremy Horder, Two Histories and Four Hidden Principles of Mens
Rea, 113 L.Q. REV. 95 (1997) (describing the history of mens rea doctrine as inconsistent with
and more complicated than the correspondence principle that scholars widely endorsed in the
mid-twentieth century).
179. Scholars have likewise noted that for English criminal law, the correspondence
principle is an aspirational rather than descriptive claim. See NICOLA LACEY, CELIA WELL &
OLIVER QUICK, RECONSTRUCTING CRIMINAL LAW 60–61 (3d ed. 2003) (noting prominent
statutory exceptions to the correspondence principle); Jeremy Horder, A Critique of the
Correspondence Principle of Criminal Law, 1995 CRIM. L. REV. 759, 759 (explaining that the
correspondence principle “remains very much an ideal, if anything, rather than an accurate
descriptive generalisation”). See generally Horder, supra note 178 (offering a historical account
of English criminal law and finding no tradition of the correspondence principle).
180. Professor Paul Robinson, the leading American scholar of criminal codes, has tested
public lay views on comparisons among the grading levels of various offenses, many of which
were defined by consequences (for example, the value of property taken in theft or injury
resulting from assault). The data suggest that lay judgments about comparative offense severity
often differ from those codified in criminal statutes, although grading views turned on results
and circumstances as well as state of mind, not always with the former limited by the latter.
Robinson et al., supra note 112, at 714–15. Robinson and his coauthors argue that
correspondence between majoritarian judgments and criminal law values is important to law’s
legitimacy and efficacy. See id. at 715 (“Assessments of proper offense grade are classic
expressions of societal values, which are properly set by the most democratic branch of
government and the one charged with collectively making such value judgments—the
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longstanding problem of “moral luck” that characterizes even core
criminal offenses, some of which hold an actor responsible for events
181
beyond his control. Evidence for this view lies not only in mens rea
requirements but in sentencing statutes and guidelines as well, which
adjust sentences based on results and circumstances without regard to
182
a defendant’s intent or awareness. If broader sentiment and
legislative policy do not suggest a consistent endorsement of a strong
role for culpability in punishment allocation, it is easier to understand
why courts have not moved to strengthen culpability requirements
despite the seeming commands of presumptions in many state codes.

legislature.”); id. at 717 n.3 (“[N]on-uniformity of sentences [due to reliance on judicial
discretion instead of legislative command] may . . . negatively affect compliance with the law by
reducing the public perception of the legal system as legitimate . . . .”); id. at 717 (“[I]mproper
grading of offenses can lead to inefficient spending.”).
181. See Dana K. Nelkin, Moral Luck, STANFORD ENCYC. OF PHILOSOPHY (June 3, 2008),
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/moral-luck (“Moral luck occurs when an agent
can be correctly treated as an object of moral judgment despite the fact that a significant aspect
of what she is assessed for depends on factors beyond her control . . . . The problem of moral
luck arises because we seem to be committed to the general principle that we are morally
assessable only to the extent that what we are assessed for depends on factors under our
control. . . . At the same time, when it comes to countless particular cases, we morally assess
agents for things that depend on factors that are not in their control. . . . [I]f we accept the
Control Principle in unqualified form, and deny the existence of moral circumstantial, character,
and causal luck, then it seems that no actual punishment could be justified on the basis of moral
desert.); see also GEORGE FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 473–74 (1978) (calling the
role that results should play in offense definitions a “deep, unresolved issue in criminal
liability”). For a comprehensive discussion of moral luck theory, see generally BERNARD
WILLIAMS, MORAL LUCK (1981).
182. See, e.g., MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES & COMMENTARY § 2.B.503 (2012) (noting
offense severity distinctions based on drug weight); id. § 2.G (incorporating offense severity
distinctions based on consequences in an Offense Severity Reference Table, id. § 5.A); OR.
ADMIN. R. 213-019-0008 (2004) (outlining drug offense aggravators); 204 PA. CODE §§ 303.9,
303.10 (2012) (including offense results and circumstances as sentence-enhancement criteria).

